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INTRODUCTION 
It sounds like such a simple question: do private prisons save 
money?  The answer, however, is dependent on a number of factors—
including how “saving money” is defined. 
Consider that in 2013, the nation’s largest for-profit prison 
company, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), made $300.8 
million in net profit on gross revenue of $1.69 billion.1
None.  Those “savings” went to CCA in the form of corporate 
profit. 
  Thus, the 
company achieved $300.8 million in savings over operational expenses 
at its prisons, jails, and other detention facilities.  But how much of 
that $300.8 million went to taxpayers or reverted to state treasuries or 
county coffers? 
Over the past three decades there have been dozens of reports and 
studies on and analyses of cost comparisons between public and 
privately-operated prisons—by academics, government agencies, and 
independent organizations—all attempting to answer the elusive 
question of whether private prisons save money.2
Instead, rather than trying to determine if prison privatization 
results in savings due to the shifting of costs from public agencies, this 
Article takes an opposite approach by identifying costs that are 
shifted from privately-operated facilities to the public sector.  An 
examination of such cost-shifting factors is essential when evaluating 
  This is not one of 
those attempts. 
                                                                                                                             
 1. CORR. CORP. OF AM., FORM 10-K 53–54 (2013). 
 2. See, e.g., CODY MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: 
PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA 7–9 (2012); Gerald G. Gaes, The Current Status of 
Prison Privatization Research on American Prisons, 3–8, 19–20 (2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=
gerald_gaes. 
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cost comparisons, to better understand how private prisons 
externalize expenses while internalizing profits. 
In short, public agencies want to save money while private prison 
companies have an inherent need to make money—and the latter 
necessarily comes at the expense of the former.3
Part I of this Article examines previous public-private prison cost 
comparison studies, while Part II discusses various factors that make 
such comparisons difficult.  Part III provides an exhaustive look at 
cost shifting factors, whereby costs are shifted from private prisons to 
public contracting agencies, and Part IV examines quality of service 
comparisons—including levels of violence and staff turnover at 
private prisons, accreditation by the American Correctional 
Association, and recidivism rates.  Part V addresses opportunity costs 
associated with privately-operated prisons, while the Conclusion 
proposes an alternative approach when considering whether prison 
privatization results in cost savings. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
There is no dearth of research on whether privately-operated 
correctional facilities are more cost effective or provide equivalent 
quality of service in comparison to public prisons; numerous studies 
have reached equally numerous and disparate conclusions.4  As noted 
by Alexander Volokh, an Associate Professor at Emory Law School, 
“somewhat surprisingly, for all the ink spilled on private prisons over 
the last thirty years, we have precious little good information on what 
are surely the most important questions: when it comes to cost or 
quality, are private prisons better or worse than public prisons?”5  Or, 
as candidly stated by CCA vice president Steve Owen in reference to 
whether private prisons save money: “[t]here is a mixed bag of 
research out there . . . .  It’s not as black and white and cut and dried 
as we would like.”6
                                                                                                                             
 3. Although this Article focuses on private prisons, that is not to imply that 
public prisons are without their problems and faults; further, issues related to prison 
privatization are tied to the larger problem of mass incarceration in the United 
States, considering that the vast majority of correctional facilities are operated by 
public agencies. 
 
 4. See generally PRISON PRIVATIZATION: THE MANY FACETS OF A 
CONTROVERSIAL INDUSTRY (Byron Eugene Price & John Charles Morris, eds., 2012) 
(compiling scholarly works from various commentators on prison privatization). 
 5. Alexander Volokh, Prison Accountability and Performance Measures, 63 
EMORY L.J. 339, 347 (2013). 
 6. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html. 
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A. Studies with Favorable Findings 
That mixed bag includes studies that have identified cost savings 
and other benefits resulting from prison privatization, such as 
research conducted in the 1990s by Professor Charles W. Thomas at 
the University of Florida; a 2008 study by researchers at Vanderbilt 
University; various reports by the Reason Foundation; and most 
recently a study by two Temple University economics professors, 
published in July 2014.  What do they have in common?  All received 
funding from the private prison industry. 
Professor Thomas served as director of the Private Corrections 
Project at the University of Florida, which studied the private prison 
industry and produced research and statistical data concerning prison 
privatization.7  He also owned stock in the private prison firms he was 
researching, served on the board of Prison Realty Trust, a CCA spin-
off, and received $3 million in payments from CCA/Prison Realty.8  
Thomas retired after these conflicts became known; he was later fined 
$20,000 by the Florida Commission on Ethics, which stated his 
“contractual relationships with private corrections companies, or 
companies related to the private corrections industry . . . conflicted 
with his duty to objectively evaluate the corrections industry through 
his research with the University of Florida.”9  Regardless, proponents 
of prison privatization still occasionally cite his work.10
The 2008 Vanderbilt study, which found competitive benefits 
through a shared system of public and privately-operated prisons, was 
partly funded by CCA and the Association for Private Correctional 
and Treatment Organizations (APCTO), an industry trade group.
 
11
                                                                                                                             
 7. See Alex Friedmann, University Professor Shills for Private Prison Industry, 
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 15, 1999), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/1999/feb/
15/university-professor-shills-for-private-prison-industry; Dara Kam, Ethics Board 
Fines Former UF Professor $20,000, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Oct. 22, 1999, at 1B, 
4B. 
  
The Reason Foundation, which strongly favors privatization, has 
 8. See Friedmann, supra note 7; Kam, supra note 7. 
 9. Fla. Comm. on Ethics, Final Order No. 99-21 (1999), available at http://
www.ethics.state.fl.us/orders/1997/97-100fo.html. 
 10. See, e.g., LEONARD C. GILROY ET AL., REASON FOUND. & HOWARD JARVIS 
TAXPAYERS ASS’N, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR CORRECTIONS IN 
CALIFORNIA: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN CRISIS AND REFORM (2011), available at 
http://reason.org/files/private_prisons_california.pdf; SIMON HAKIM & ERWIN A. 
BLACKSTONE, PRISON BREAK: A NEW APPROACH TO PUBLIC COST AND SAFETY 
(2014), available at http://www.independent.org/pdf/policy_reports/2014-06-30-
prision_break.pdf. 
 11. James F. Blumstein et al., Do Government Agencies Respond to Market 
Pressures? Evidence from Private Prisons, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 446 (2008). 
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received funding from private prison companies since at least the 
1990s.12  For example, a 2009 Reason Foundation donor list included 
the GEO Group—the nation’s second-largest for-profit prison firm—
as a Platinum Level supporter, while CCA was listed as a Gold Level 
supporter.13  And the report by Temple University professors Simon 
Hakim and Erwin A. Blackstone, which found substantial cost savings 
through prison privatization, received funding from the nation’s three 
largest private prison companies: CCA, the GEO Group, and 
Management & Training Corp. (MTC).14  That funding was not 
disclosed in their initial working paper, but it was mentioned when 
the study was subsequently published by The Independent Institute.15
Of course, the mere fact that these studies received funding from 
the private prison industry does not mean their findings are faulty.  
Such studies do, however, stand in contrast to another body of 
research—not funded by for-profit prison companies—that has 
reached contrary conclusions. 
 
B. Equivocal and Adverse Research Results 
As early as 1996 a report by the then-U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) reviewed five studies on prison privatization, and 
concluded that cost savings were inconclusive: “regarding operational 
costs, because the studies reported little difference and/or mixed 
results in comparing private and public facilities, we could not 
conclude whether privatization saved money.”16
A 2003 review of public and private prison cost comparisons 
published in The Prison Journal concurred, finding that “neither side 
of the correctional privatization debate should, at this time, be able to 
legitimately claim that the weight of the empirical evidence is on their 
 
                                                                                                                             
 12. PRIVATE CORR. INST., POLICY BRIEF: DO PRIVATE PRISONS SAVE MONEY? 2 
(2012), available at http://www.privateci.org/private_pics/PCI%20policy%20brief%
20on%20private%20prison%20costs%202012.pdf. 
 13. REASON FOUND., CARRYING THE TORCH OF FREEDOM (2009), available at 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/reason_magazine_supporters_in
cl_private_prisons_2009.pdf. 
 14. HAKIM & BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 70; see also Martha Woodall, 
Temple Completes Probe of Profs’ Prison Study, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 18, 2014, 
http://articles.philly.com/2014-07-18/news/51663586_1_ethics-complaint-alex-
friedmann-temple-university. 
 15. See Woodall, supra note 14; see also HAKIM & BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 
70. 
 16. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-158, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE 7 
(1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf. 
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side.”17  More recently, a meta-analysis by the University of Utah’s 
Criminal Justice Center, published in 2009, found that, “[c]ost savings 
from privatizing prisons are not guaranteed and appear minimal.”18  
The researchers, who examined a dozen studies, concluded that 
“prison privatization provides neither a clear advantage nor 
disadvantage compared with publicly managed prisons.  Neither cost 
savings nor improvements in quality of confinement are guaranteed 
through privatization.”19  Similarly, an August 2010 review by 
Professor Gerald G. Gaes at Florida State University concluded that 
“[d]irect comparisons of cost and quality neither favor the public nor 
the private sector.”20
Yet, a 2010 report by Arizona’s Office of the Auditor General, 
based on data from the Department of Corrections, noted that 




[A]ccording to the Department’s Fiscal Year 2009 Operating Per 
Capita Cost Report, the State paid private prisons a higher per 
inmate rate than it spent on equivalent services at state-operated 
facilities in fiscal year 2009.  After adjusting state and private rates 
to make them more comparable, the Department’s study found that 
rates paid to private facilities were higher for both minimum- and 
medium-custody beds—the two categories of beds for which the 
Department contracts.
  The report stated: 
22
Specifically, after adjusting “for healthcare costs, depreciation 
costs, and costs for functions provided only by the State,” the 
Auditor’s Office reported that the fiscal year (FY) 2009 per diem cost 
for minimum-security prisoners at state facilities was $46.81, 
compared with $47.14 at private prisons, while the per diem cost for 
 
                                                                                                                             
 17. Dina Perrone & Travis C. Pratt, Comparing the Quality of Confinement and 
Cost-Effectiveness of Public Versus Private Prisons: What We Know, Why We Do 
Not Know More, and Where to Go from Here, 83 PRISON J. 301, 315–16 (2003), 
available at http://tpj.sagepub.com/content/83/3/301.full.pdf. 
 18. Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization: A Meta-Analysis of Cost and 
Quality of Confinement Indicators, 19 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 383, 383 (2009), 
available at http://www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/luhndahl-prisons-.pdf. 
 19. Id. at 392. 
 20. Gaes, supra note 2, at 8. 
 21. STATE OF ARIZ. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., REPORT NO. 10-08, 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS—PRISON POPULATION GROWTH (2010), available at 
http://www.azauditor.gov/Reports/State_Agencies/Agencies/Corrections_Departmen
t_of/Performance/10-08/10-08.pdf. 
 22. Id. at 19–20. 
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medium-security prisoners at state facilities was $48.13, compared 
with $55.89 at private prisons.23
Somewhat similar results were reported by the Arizona 
Department of Corrections (ADC) in an April 2011 report that found 
the FY 2010 adjusted daily per capita cost for minimum-security 
prisoners at state prisons was $46.59, just slightly higher than the 
$46.56 cost at in-state privately-operated facilities.
 
24  The adjusted per 
capita cost for medium-security prisoners was $48.42 at state 
prisons—significantly lower than the $53.02 cost at in-state private 
prisons.25
In Georgia, cost allocations by the state Department of Corrections 
found, based on FY 2012 data, that the average per diem cost at state 
prisons was $51.27 while the cost at privately-operated facilities was 
$52.75, or around 2.88% higher.
   
26  Considering only state funds and 
excluding proration of central office expenses, the average per diem 
cost at state prisons was $49.69 compared with $52.30—around 5.2% 
higher—at privately-operated facilities.27
Apparently, the results of the existing body of research on public-
private prison cost comparisons depend in part on who performs the 
study, and partly on what factors are considered when evaluating cost 
measures; for example, how per diem rates are calculated. 
 
II.  DIFFICULTIES IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPARISONS 
Why are there such dissimilar research outcomes, with some 
studies finding cost savings through prison privatization, others not 
being able to determine if savings occur, and yet others concluding 
that private prisons result in higher costs?  In one case, separate 
studies by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and Abt Associates28
                                                                                                                             
 23. Id. at 20. 
 
examined the same four facilities, three public and one private, over 
 24. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., FY 2010 OPERATING PER CAPITA COST REPORT 3 
(2011), available at http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/pdf/0904prison.pdf. 
 25. Id. 
 26. GA. DEP’T OF CORR., FY 2013 ALLOCATION OF COST TO INMATES, 
PROBATIONERS, ETC. 1 (2014), available at http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/pdf/
CorrectionsCosts.pdf. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Abt Associates, a private firm, frequently conducts research for government 
agencies. See ABT ASSOCIATES, www.abtassociates.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
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the same time period, and reported markedly different results.29
It is hard to compare private and public prisons unless they share 
similar security levels, population types (including gender, average 
age of offenders, medical and mental health care needs, etc.), staffing 
levels, programming, age of the facility, and other relevant 
characteristics.
  A 
number of factors make an apples-to-apples comparison difficult. 
30  Absent comparable facilities, researchers lack 
comparable data.  Thus, some studies have attempted to analyze 
hypothetical public and private prisons rather than actual ones.31
A methodologically sound cost comparison analysis of BOP and 
private low and minimum security facilities is not currently feasible 
because BOP does not gather data from private facilities that are 
comparable to the data collected on BOP facilities . . . .  [W]ithout 
comparable data, BOP is not able to analyze and justify whether 
confining inmates in private facilities would be more cost-effective 
than other confinement alternatives such as constructing new BOP 
facilities or renovating existing BOP facilities.
  In 
other cases, studies have concluded that such comparisons simply are 
not possible; as noted by the GAO in an October 2007 report: 
32
Or as stated by Davidson County, Tennessee, Sheriff Daron Hall, 
past president of the American Correctional Association and a 
former CCA program manager, “I’ve seen so many different attempts 
to compare the two [public and private prisons] that I don’t know if 
there is a simple way to evaluate one versus the other.”
 
33
Consider that when comparing public and privately-operated 
prisons, the costs of the former are just as important as those of the 
latter.  While the focus tends to be on expenses at private prisons, 
without accurate costs for public prisons such comparisons are 
meaningless.  In some cases the methodology for determining 
baseline operating expenses at public prisons has been faulted, which 
 
                                                                                                                             
 29. See Gerry Gaes, Cost, Performance Studies Look at Prison Privatization, 
NAT’L INST. JUST. J., March 2008, at 32, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/221507.pdf; see also Volokh, supra note 5. 
 30. See DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE iv–v (1998), available at http://www.abt
associates.com/Reports/priv-report.pdf. 
 31. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 16, at 26. 
 32. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-6, COST OF PRISONS: BUREAU 
OF PRISONS NEEDS BETTER DATA TO ASSESS ALTERNATIVES FOR ACQUIRING LOW 
AND MINIMUM SECURITY FACILITIES 10 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/270/267839.pdf. 
 33. Annmarie Timmins, N.H. Officials Mull Private Prison Bids, CONCORD 
MONITOR, Apr. 8, 2012, http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/322211/nh-officials-
mull-private-prison-bids (quoting Daron Hall). 
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undermines public-private prison cost comparisons.  In Hawaii, which 
houses almost a third of its prisoners in privately-operated facilities 
on the U.S. mainland, a December 2010 report by the state Auditor’s 
office cited problems with the way the Hawaii Department of Public 
Safety (PSD) calculated costs at in-state public prisons.34  According 
to the Auditor, “PSD reports that it spends about twice as much to 
maintain an inmate in-state.  However, we found that these cost 
estimates are based on a flawed methodology designed around what 
is easiest for the department to report, or, as one PSD official 
characterized, ‘quick and dirty’ numbers.”35  Consequently, the “true 
costs are unknown.”36  The Auditor’s office released a follow-up 
report in April 2013, noting that the PSD had “improved the accuracy 
of its incarceration data, employing a more systematic process that 
utilizes comparable costs and cost-accounting methodology.”37  
However, the report also found that due to various factors, “the 
department’s calculation on per capita incarceration costs for the 
various inmate populations is still inaccurate and skews overall 
inmate costs.”38
But private prison companies and their proponents make it sound 
so easy: as one theoretical example, say the average per diem cost for 
housing a prisoner at a state facility is $55 while the average cost at a 
private prison is $45.  Thus, obviously, the privately-operated prison 
saves money.  That comparison, however, falls somewhere between 
the “damned lies” and “statistics” of the well-known aphorism 
variously attributed to Mark Twain or Benjamin Disraeli: “[t]here are 
three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics.”
 
39  Some 
comparisons of public versus private prison costs rely heavily on 
statistical prevarication.  Take, as an example, a joint report released 
by the Reason Foundation and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers 
Association (HJTA) in 2010.40
                                                                                                                             
 34. HAW. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR, REPORT NO. 10-10, MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY’S CONTRACTING FOR PRISON BEDS AND 
SERVICES (2010), available at http://files.hawaii.gov/auditor/Reports/2010/10-10.pdf. 
  The report advocated sending 25,000 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 15. 
 37. HAW. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR, REPORT NO. 13-03, REPORT ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE AUDITOR’S 2010 RECOMMENDATIONS 45 (2013), 
available at http://files.hawaii.gov/auditor/Reports/2013/13-03.pdf. 
 38. Id. at 47. 
 39. For an exhaustive discussion on the origin of this saying, see Lies, Damned 
Lies and Statistics, UNIV. OF YORK, http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/maths/histstat/
lies.htm (last revised July 19, 2012). 
 40. GILROY ET AL., supra note 10. 
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California prisoners to out-of-state privately-operated facilities, 
claiming savings of up to $1.8 billion over a five-year period based on 
an estimated $162 per diem cost at in-state prisons.41  California 
currently houses around 9000 prisoners in out-of-state facilities.42
The Private Corrections Institute (PCI),
 
43
The $162 per diem rate cited in the report, which was obtained by 
simply dividing the state’s corrections budget by its prison 
population, grossly misrepresents the actual cost of incarceration.  
For example, the inflated per diem rate in the Reason-HJTA report 
inaccurately includes parole supervision and administrative costs, 
which are part of the prison system’s budget; medical and mental 
health care expenses, which are under the control of the federally-
appointed receiver; and central office administrative overhead.  The 
report’s exaggerated per diem rate also apparently includes prison 
design and construction expenses, which are not factored into 
private prison cost analyses.  The report fails to consider that 
privately-run prisons do not house maximum-security California 
prisoners, death row prisoners, female prisoners, juveniles or 
prisoners with serious mental health or medical conditions, all of 
whom are more expensive to incarcerate. In the latter regard, 
medical costs for California inmates held in private prisons are 
capped at $2,500 per prisoner; the state must pay medical expenses 
above that amount, plus all treatment costs for inmates who are 
HIV-positive.
 which opposes the 
privatization of correctional services, issued a press release on May 
21, 2010, stating: 
44
In fact, the California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) reported 
in a January 2007 letter that, “the state now budgets on average about 
$56 per inmate per day for each additional prison inmate—often 
referred to as overcrowding costs per inmate.  By comparison, the 
contracted rate for . . . new out of state prison beds is higher, about 
$63 per inmate per day.”
 
45
                                                                                                                             
 41. Id. 
  The LAO further noted that the per diem 
 42. See Out of State Population Capacity, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & 
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Visitors/CA_Out_Of_State_Facilities.html 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 43. PRIVATE CORRECTIONS INST., www.privateci.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).  
Note: the author serves as president of the Private Corrections Institute. 
 44. Press Release, Private Corr. Inst., Report on Prison Privatization Plagued with 
Conflicts of Interest, Faulty Data, Political Connections (May 25, 2010), available at 
http://penknifepresscop.blogspot.com/2010/05/report-on-prison-privatization-
plagued.html. 
 45. Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill, LAO Legislative Analyst, to Gloria Romero, 
Cal. State Senator (Jan. 5, 2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/
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rate for prisoners in out-of-state private prisons did not include 
transportation costs, the cost of oversight by state officials or medical 
expenses above the $2500 cap.46
This led PCI executive director Ken Kopczynski to observe: 
“[c]ontrasting the inaccurate per diem rate in the [Reason-HJTA] 
report with the cost of housing inmates in out-of-state private prisons 
cannot even be considered an apples-to-oranges comparison.  It’s 
more like an apples-to-fish comparison.”
 
47
III.  COST-SHIFTING FACTORS 
 
Typically, private prison contracts are based on a per diem model; 
the public contracting agency, such as a state Department of 
Correction or sheriff’s office, pays a set amount per prisoner, per day 
to the private prison company; therefore, to reduce costs, contracting 
agencies are incentivized to contract with the company offering the 
lowest per diem rate.  But as indicated above and discussed below, 
there are a number of factors that can result in costs to public 
agencies beyond the contractual per diem rate.  Such cost-shifting 
factors, which include differences in prisoner populations and security 
levels, medical expenses, transportation costs, and administrative 
overhead, serve to inflate the costs paid by the public contracting 
agency while deflating the expenses of private prison companies.  
Many of the earlier studies that compared costs at public and private 
prisons failed to adequately address relevant cost-shifting factors, 
including long-term expenses.48
As noted above, a 2010 report by Arizona’s Office of the Auditor 
General found that privately-operated prisons were more expensive 
than public prisons when using an adjusted per capita rate.  Using a 
non-adjusted rate, the report found the cost for housing minimum-
security prisoners in private facilities was $54.78—significantly less 
than the non-adjusted per capita rate of $58.80 at public prisons.
  The importance of adjusting for 
factors that shift costs from private prisons to the public sector is 
demonstrated by the following examples. 
49




 46. Id. 
 47. Press Release, Private Corr. Inst., supra note 44. 
 48. See supra Part I. 
 49. STATE OF ARIZ. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., supra note 21, at 20.  The non-
adjusted rate of medium-security prisons still indicated that privately-operated 
facilities cost more than state prisons, though the difference was around sixty percent 
smaller. Id. 
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The non-adjusted rate indicated cost savings to the state, while the 
adjusted rate indicated a net loss—evidencing the need to adjust for 
cost-shifting factors.50
Also, according to a 2009 report by the Hawaii Department of 
Public Safety related to expenditures for housing offenders in out-of-
state private prisons, such costs were $48.04 million in FY 2009 based 
on contractual per diem rates.
 
51  However, those costs did not include 
certain medical expenses, transportation expenses, staffing costs, the 
cost of prisoners’ wages, and various overhead expenses.52  When 
those costs were factored in, the adjusted expenditures for housing 
Hawaii prisoners at private facilities totaled $57.38 million—a 19.4% 
increase.53  Nor was this an anomaly.  The Hawaii Department of 
Public Safety’s expenditure report for FY 2008 indicated a 14.7% 
increase between the contractual housing costs ($48.39 million) and 
adjusted expenditures including medical care, prisoner wages, 
transportation, staffing, and other expenses ($55.52 million).54  For 
FY 2007, there was a 14.9% increase between contractual housing 
costs ($43.76 million) and adjusted expenditures ($50.29 million).55
Given that prior research has found any cost savings resulting from 
prison privatization are often equivocal, even small variations due to 
cost-shifting factors can mean the difference between a net gain or 
loss by public contracting agencies.  This is of heightened importance 
in states that have statutory cost saving requirements as a condition of 
prison privatization, including Tennessee (minimum 5% savings 




                                                                                                                             
 50. Adjusted per capita cost data was discontinued beginning in 2012; since then 
the Arizona Department of Corrections has only reported unadjusted per capita 
costs, after the Arizona legislature repealed a state law requiring private prison cost 
comparisons. See Private Prisons: Let’s See Hidden Cost Comparisons, AZCENTRAL 
(Jan. 1, 2014), www.azcentral.com/opinions/articles/20140101private-prisons-hidden-
cost-comparisons.html. 
  The consideration of cost-shifting factors is 
 51. STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, REPORT TO THE 2010 LEGISLATURE, 
HCR 312, Exhibit A (2009), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/
publications/Hawaii%202009%20report.pdf. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at Exhibit B. 
 56. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 957.07(1) (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
197.510(13) (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-1211(3)(a) (West 2012); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.06(A)(4) (West 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 41-24-104(c)(2)(B), 
41-24-105(c) (West 2014); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 495.003(c)(4) (West 2013). 
2014] APPLES-TO-FISH 515 
essential in such cases to determine whether the statutory mandate is 
being met. 
Yet even in states that require prison privatization to result in a 
minimum level of cost savings, it is still difficult to determine whether 
such savings are in fact realized; just because the law says private 
prisons must save money does not necessarily mean they do.  As put 
bluntly by the Florida Center for Fiscal and Economic Policy in a 
2010 report, which described in detail the state’s process for 
determining whether prison privatization results in statutory cost 
savings: “[t]here is no compelling evidence that the privatization of 
prisons has actually resulted in savings . . . .  It is very difficult to 
ensure that a private prison is in fact 7% less costly to operate than a 
comparable public prison.”57  And in Ohio, which requires privately-
operated prisons to achieve cost savings of at least 5%, Policy Matters 
Ohio, a non-profit policy research organization, released a report in 
April 2011 that sharply criticized the methodology used by state 
officials to calculate estimated savings.58  “A detailed examination of 
those calculations shows them not only to be riddled with errors, 
oversights and omissions of significant data, but also potentially 
tainted by controversial accounting assumptions that many experts 
consider deeply flawed,” the report stated.59  “[O]nce past errors in 
the state calculations are corrected and revisions made, the private-
prison savings computed by the state over the years appear to shrink 
dramatically.”60
Policy Matters Ohio estimated that for the 2006–2007 biennium, 
prison privatization actually cost the state between $380,000 and 
$700,000 per year based on corrections to the state’s statistical data, 
and in 2008–2009 private prison costs ranged from a potential 1.2% 
savings to a 0.3% deficit.
 
61  Further, the estimated savings from prison 
privatization for 2010 and 2011 dropped below the 5% threshold 
required by state law once statistical revisions were made.62
Of course there are also prison privatization-related factors that 
shift costs away from the public sector.  As just one example, some 
 
                                                                                                                             
 57. FLA. CTR. FOR FISCAL & ECON. POLICY, ARE FLORIDA’S PRIVATE PRISONS 
KEEPING THEIR PROMISE? 4–5 (2010), available at http://www.fcfep.org/attachments/
20100409--Private%20Prisons. 
 58. See BOB PAYNTER, POLICY MATTERS OHIO, CELLS FOR SALE: 
UNDERSTANDING PRISON COSTS & SAVINGS i–ii (2011), available at http://www.policy
mattersohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CellsForSale2011.pdf. 
 59. Id. at i. 
 60. Id. at ii. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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research studies, including the Hakim and Blackstone study 
referenced above, have argued that prison privatization reduces costs 
to public agencies by cutting payroll, benefit, and pension expenses 
associated with (typically unionized) public corrections employees.63  
That argument assumes corrections employees are terminated when 
public agencies contract with private prison companies, but this is not 
always the case.  Rather, public corrections employees may be 
transferred to other positions within the same agency or to other 
agencies—thus resulting in continued payroll, benefit, and pension 
costs in addition to any costs of privatization.64
For instance, when Ohio privatized the North Central Correctional 
Institution (NCCI) in 2011, the state noted that it had vacant 
positions within the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
(DRC) to accommodate employees who did not want to work for the 
contractor.
  Absent evidence that 
corrections employees are terminated or otherwise depart public 
service when public agencies contract with private prison companies, 
such savings are strictly theoretical. 
65  According to a memo provided to staff at the facility, in 
answer to the question “[w]ill a correction officer currently employed 
at NCCI be able to find employment at another state run prison if 
they do not wish to work for the private operator?” the state’s 
response was: “Yes.  NCCI currently employs 208 correction officers, 
and DRC has 278 vacant correction officer positions in its North 
Region.”66  Thus, any public employee who wanted to remain 
employed by the state was able to do so.67
                                                                                                                             
 63. HAKIM & BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 42. 
  In fact, according to the 
 64. Comparatively, when public prisons close, the employees at those facilities are 
often transferred to other positions in the Department of Correction, not terminated. 
See, e.g. Christopher Petrella & Alex Friedmann, Slowly Closing the Gates: A State-
by-State Assessment of Recent Prison Closures, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (June 15, 
2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/jun/15/slowly-closing-the-gates-a-
state-by-state-assessment-of-recent-prison-closures. 
 65. OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., PRISON SALE ANNOUNCEMENT QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS, available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/Public/privatizationfaqs.pdf. 
 66. Id. at 2. 
 67. Also consider that if public corrections employees do leave public service as a 
result of prison privatization, there may be costs associated with their departures.  
When Florida considered privatizing around one-quarter of the state’s prison system 
in 2011, affecting over 4000 state workers, the Department of Corrections estimated 
the plan would incur $25 million in payments to departing employees for 
“accumulated vacation time, sick leave and special compensatory time for working on 
holidays.” See Steve Bousquet, Florida’s Private Prison Plan Comes with Unexpected 
$25 Million Cost to Taxpayers, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Aug. 16, 2011, http://
www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/floridas-private-prison-plan-comes-
with-unexpected-25-million-cost-to/1186300. 
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DRC, when the 2700-bed NCCI was privatized only twenty-three 
public employees lost their jobs—fifteen were laid off, one was 
terminated, three resigned, and four retired.68
The focus of this Part, however, is on factors that shift costs from 
private prison companies to the public sector, which include costs 
related to population differences at privately-operated facilities, such 
as security levels and prisoner medical care, as well as operational 
expenses—including transportation, prisoner labor, administrative 
overhead, and bed guarantees—plus the long-term costs of per diem 
increases, deferred maintenance, recidivism rates, and private prison 
bond financing. 
 
A. Prisoner Population Differences 
To fulfill their public safety function, public prisons must house all 
types of offenders, including those with serious medical and mental 
health conditions, maximum-security prisoners, those on death row,69 
female prisoners, and juveniles convicted as adults.  Prisoners in these 
categories are more expensive to incarcerate due to medical, 
security/staffing, or programming-related costs (e.g., female prisoners 
generally have higher medical expenses).70
In most cases, private prisons house minimum- and medium-
security adult male prisoners.  No privately-operated facilities house 
prisoners sentenced to death, and only a few hold maximum-security 
or female prisoners.
  Thus, the average per 
diem cost at public prisons is inflated, as it necessarily includes the 
more expensive prisoners that public prison systems must incarcerate. 
71
                                                                                                                             
 68. Email from Daniel Flowers, Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (Aug. 22, 2014) 
(on file with author).  Further, when Ohio’s North Central Correctional Institution 
was privatized in late 2011, seventy state employees were hired by the contractor 
(MTC), while “297 transferred to other state jobs, and eight retired.” Julie Carr 
Smyth, Marion Prison Ready to Go Private on Saturday, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 
30, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/12/30/marion-prison-
ready-to-go-private-on-saturday.html. 
  As a result, the average per diem cost at 
 69. That is, in the thirty-two states that have the death penalty. See States With 
and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 70. See, e.g., infra Table 1 (breaking down prison costs for Florida); infra Table 2 
(breaking down prison costs for Tennessee). 
 71. For example, according to the 2013 annual report for CCA—the nation’s 
largest private prison contractor—of the company’s sixty-eight owned, operated, and 
leased facilities, only two were designated maximum-security.  None housed death 
row prisoners, and just two were designated women’s prisons or detention centers. 
See CORR. CORP. OF AM., supra note 1, at 11–15; see also Find a Facility, CORR. 
CORP. AM., www.cca.com/locations (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
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privately-operated facilities is reduced due to differences in prisoner 
populations.  Also as a result, private prisons have been accused of 
housing only healthier, lower-security prisoners who are less costly to 
incarcerate.72  “It’s cherry-picking,” exclaimed Texas State Rep. Chad 
Campbell.73  “They leave the most expensive prisoners with taxpayers 
and take the easy prisoners.”74  Or, as stated in an April 2010 policy 
brief by the Florida Center for Fiscal and Economic Policy, “[t]here 
are differences between inmates in private and public prisons: those 
who are more costly to handle are usually incarcerated in public 
prisons, such as those who are the highest security risks and those 
with extensive medical issues.”75
An examination of public and private prison per diem costs in 
Florida illustrates how population differences impact cost 
comparisons. The following table, produced by the Florida 
Department of Corrections (FDOC), provides “average inmate costs” 
for FY 2012–2013.
  Both private prison companies and 
public contracting agencies are complicit in such “cherry-picking,” as 
limitations on the types of prisoners held at privately-operated 
facilities are usually specified in the contracts signed by both parties. 
76  Approximately ten percent of Florida state 
prisoners are held in seven privately-operated prisons, including five 
facilities that house adult male offenders, one facility that houses 






                                                                                                                             
 72. See, e.g., IN THE PUB. INTEREST, THE COSTS OF PRIVATE PRISONS 5 (2014), 
available at http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/default/files/Prison%20Costs%20
Backgrounder%20Brief_Template.pdf. 
 73. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html. 
 74. Id. 
 75. FLA. CTR. FOR FISCAL AND ECON. POLICY, supra note 57, at 3. 
 76. See Budget, 2012–2013 Agency Statistics, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1213/budget.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 77. See Private Prison Monitoring, FLA. DEP’T OF MGMT. SERVICES, 
www.dms.myflorida.com/business_operations/private_prison_monitoring (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2014). 
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TABLE 1.  FLORIDA PER DIEM COSTS FOR FY 2012–201378


















The above per diem figures “do not include indirect and 
administrative cost of $0.67 for private institutions and $2.75 for state 
facilities.”79  Thus, after adding the indirect and administrative costs, 
the total average per diem cost for all state prisons, excluding 
privately-operated facilities, is $50.25, while the average per diem cost 
for private institutions is $44.53.80
It is apparent that the per diem cost at private institutions is lower 
than the cost at public prisons.  However, the average per diem cost 
for state prisons includes the higher rates at reception centers (all of 
which are operated by the state), male youthful offender facilities (of 
which one is run by the state and one is privatized), adult and 
youthful female offender facilities (of which four are operated by the 
state and one by a private contractor), and specialty institutions (all of 
which are operated by the state).
 
81
 78. FLA. CTR. FOR FISCAL & ECON. POLICY, supra note 57, at 3. 
  Therefore, due to the higher-cost 
 79. Budget, supra note 76.  The Summary of Average Inmate Costs table includes 
a useful breakdown of per diem costs by security operations, health services, and 
education services. 
 80. The term “contracted facility” in the table refers to Community Release 
Centers, not prisons. Email from Jessica Cary, FDOC Dir. of Comm. (Aug. 20, 2014) 
(on file with author). 
 81. Facility Directory, FLA. DEP’T. CORRECTIONS (last updated Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/orginfo/facilitydir.html. 
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facilities, the vast majority of which are publicly-operated, the 
average per diem cost at state prisons is skewed upwards while five of 
the seven private prisons house adult male offenders—the least 
expensive to incarcerate, according to the table. 
For another example of the impact of population differences, 
consider the FY 2012–2013 per diem costs for housing adult prisoners 
in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), where almost 
one-quarter of the state’s prison population—approximately 5000 of 
21,000 prisoners—is held in privately-operated facilities: 
TABLE 2. TENNESSEE PER DIEM COSTS FOR FY 2012–2013 























Facilities designated with (*) are privately operated.82
                                                                                                                             
 82. Emails from Tashonda Burton, Office of Commc’ns & Pub. Relations, Tenn. 
Dep’t of Corr. (July 1–2, 2014) (on file with author).  The “annual cost per inmate 
[does] not include the Administration, Tennessee Correctional Academy, Office of 
Investigation and Compliance, or Major Maintenance costs.” Id. 
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First, per the TDOC, the Total Adult Facilities per diem cost does 
not equal an average of the individual facility costs because the latter 
are weighted by population level.  Rather, the total average per diem 
cost is “based on system wide Payroll expenses plus system wide 
Operating expenses minus system wide Revenue collections divided 
by our system wide Average Daily Census divided by 365 to obtain 
the average system wide cost per day.”83
The three privately-operated prisons—all run by CCA—are 
medium-security facilities that house adult male prisoners.
 
84  Of the 
eleven public prisons, six are maximum-security, one is close-security 
(a step between medium and maximum) and four are medium-
security.85  The four facilities with the highest per diem costs, all state 
prisons, include the Lois M. DeBerry Special Needs Facility (a prison 
hospital for offenders with serious medical and mental health needs); 
Riverbend (maximum-security and death row prisoners); Bledsoe 
County (an intake diagnostic center that also houses female 
prisoners); and Mark Luttrell (female prisoners).86
Because state facilities house prisoners who are more expensive to 
incarcerate—maximum security, death row, medical and mental 
health patients, and female prisoners—their average per diem cost is 
increased.  As the CCA-operated prisons do not have such higher-
cost populations, their average per diem costs are decreased.  
However, note that the per diem costs at medium-security state 
prisons (Northeast, Charles Bass, Turney Center, and Northwest) are 
still higher than the costs at privately-operated medium-security 
facilities (South Central, Hardeman County, and Whiteville).  Why is 
this the case?  As discussed in the sections that follow, a number of 
other cost-shifting factors serve to further inflate per diem costs at 
public prisons. 
 
B. Security Level Limitations 
Security levels correlate with incarceration costs; minimum-security 
prisoners are usually the least expensive to incarcerate while 
maximum-security prisoners, including those held in segregation, are 
                                                                                                                             
 83. Id. 
 84. TENN. DEP’T OF CORR., FY 2013 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 46 (2013), available 
at http://www.tn.gov/correction/pdf/StatisticalAbstract2013.pdf. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See State Prisons, TENN. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, www.tn.gov/correction/
institutions/stateprisons.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
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the most costly.87
[T]he private sector houses approximately 21% fewer inmates at the 
maximum and close security levels and approximately 15% more 
inmates at the minimum security level than does the public sector.  
Thus, 90% of the private sector’s inmate population is classified at 
the medium or minimum levels, whereas only 69% of the public 
sector’s inmate population are so designated.
  With respect to security levels at public and 
privately-operated prisons, a 2004 article in Federal Probation noted 
that: 
88
The State of Hawaii contracts with private prison companies to 
house prisoners at facilities on the U.S. mainland.  A January 2005 
report by the Hawaii Department of Public Safety is instructive in 
regard to limitations on the types of Hawaii prisoners eligible for 
transfers to private prisons in various other states.
 
89  Those limitations 
included that no Hawaii prisoners above medium security, or with 
“Escape 1,” “Murder 1,” or sex offenses, be housed at facilities in 
Oklahoma.90  No maximum-security prisoners could be held in 
prisons in Arizona or Mississippi, and Colorado facilities only housed 
prisoners up to medium security with no “sex offenses with lengthy 
terms” and no life sentences.91
                                                                                                                             
 87. For costs related to prisoners held in solitary confinement, see SAL 
RODRIGUEZ, FACT SHEET: THE HIGH COST OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (2011), 
available at http://solitarywatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/fact-sheet-the-high-
cost-of-solitary-confinement.pdf.  More generally, for costs that escalate by security 
level, see NANCY LA VIGNE & JULIE SAMUELS, THE GROWTH & INCREASING COST OF 
THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM: DRIVERS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 2 (2012), 
available at www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412693-the-growth-and-increasing-cost-of-
the-federal-prison-system.pdf (providing costs by security level in federal prisons). 
  This list of exclusions illustrates how 
only lower-security Hawaii prisoners who have not been convicted of 
the most serious offenses (murder, sex crimes), and are a lesser 
security risk (no life sentences, maximum security, or history of 
escape) are transferred to privately-operated facilities.  Public 
prisons, of course, must incarcerate the higher-security offenders not 
eligible for such transfers, which translates to higher costs for 
Hawaii’s state prison system. 
 88. Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, Private and Public Sector Prisons—A 
Comparison of Select Characteristics, FED. PROBATION, June 2004, at 27, 28. 
 89. HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, RESPONSE TO ACT 200, PART III, SECTION 58 
SESSION LAWS OF HAWAII 2003 AS AMENDED BY ACT 41, PART II, SECTION 35 
SESSION LAWS OF HAWAII 2004 (2005), available at http://dps.hawaii.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/2005-Report4.pdf. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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Another example of security level differences in public and private 
prisons is found in a 2012 contract between Idaho and CCA to house 
offenders at the company’s Kit Carson Correctional Center in 
Colorado.  In response to questions posed during the request for 
proposal (RFP) process, state officials wrote that the transfer criteria 
used by the Idaho Department of Correction to send prisoners to the 
privately-operated facility include: “2. No escape history from a 
secure facility . . . [and] 4. No class A disciplinary actions 
(Disciplinary Offense Report) within last 12 months.”92
C. Medical Cost-Shifting 
  Thus, only 
lower-risk prisoners and those who are better behaved—i.e., do not 
have a recent history of serious institutional misconduct—are eligible 
for placement at the CCA facility.  Those who are higher-risk and 
have committed serious disciplinary offenses remain in Idaho, and the 
cost of incarcerating such prisoners is shifted to the state. 
Medical expenses represent a significant and growing portion of 
corrections agencies’ budgets.  The FDOC, for example, spent 19.1% 
of its budget on healthcare services in FY 2012–2013.93  The 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 
allocated 24% of its $8.9 billion budget for FY 2013–2014 to medical, 
dental, mental health, and ancillary health care services.94  As 
mentioned previously, public prisons must incarcerate all types of 
prisoners, including those with serious and expensive medical and 
mental health conditions.95
This is a significant cost-shifting factor because medical care can be 
very expensive, especially treatment for diseases that are more 
prevalent in the correctional setting than in the general population, 
such as HIV and hepatitis C (HCV),
  Frequently, though, private prison 
companies minimize medical expenses through various contractual 
provisions that shift those costs to the public sector. 
96
                                                                                                                             
 92. Contract Purchase Order between Dep’t of Corr., Idaho, and Corr. Corp. of 
Am. for Kit Carson Correctional Center, No. CPO02476 27 (July 11, 2012). 
 as well as for costly medical 
procedures such as chemotherapy, dialysis, and even organ 
 93. See Budget, supra note 76. 
 94. CDCR’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2013–2014, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & 
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Budget/Budget_Overview.html. 
 95. See supra Part III.A. 
 96. See The State of HIV and Hepatitis C Care in NYS Prisons, CORRECTIONAL 
ASS’N N.Y., (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.correctionalassociation.org/news/the-state-of-
hiv-and-hepatitis-c-care-in-nys-prisons-2013. 
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transplants.97
As the Arizona Department of Corrections stated in an April 2011 
report, when calculating per capita costs at public and private prisons:  
  Prisoners have all of the same medical ailments as non-
prisoners and require medical care that is just as expensive.  By 
capping the cost of medical care, excluding certain medical costs 
entirely and limiting prisoners with medical and mental health 
conditions from being housed at private prisons, the per diem costs at 
those facilities are decreased.  This results in a corresponding increase 
in medical expenses for public corrections agencies, which are 
responsible for medical and mental health care costs both at public 
prisons and—when specified by contractual provisions—at private 
prisons, too.  Consequently, cost comparisons of public and privately-
operated facilities must include adjustments for contractual limits on 
medical expenses that shift costs to public agencies. 
An inmate health care cost factor is identified and deducted due to 
the limitations imposed by the private contractors concerning 
inmates [sic] physical and mental health . . . .  This adjustment is 
needed because unlike the private contractors, the ADC is required 
to provide medical and mental health services to inmates regardless 
of the severity of their condition(s).98
1. HIV, HCV, and Other Specified Medical Conditions 
 
Private prison contracts often contain provisions that exempt 
private prison companies from costs associated with specified medical 
conditions, most commonly HIV and HCV.  For example, a 2011 
contract between the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation and CCA specifies that the CDCR is required to pay 
for “[a]ll HIV or AIDS related inpatient and outpatient medical costs 
and the costs of providing AZT or other medications therapeutically 
indicated and medically necessary . . . for the treatment of offenders 
with HIV or AIDS.”99
Similarly, a 2007 contract between the State of Tennessee and 
CCA to operate the South Central Correctional Center provides that 
“[t]he Contractor shall not be responsible for the cost of providing 
 
                                                                                                                             
 97. See Prisoner Organ Transplants, Donations Create Controversy, PRISON 
LEGAL NEWS (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/apr/15/
prisoner-organ-transplants-donations-create-controversy. 
 98. ARIZ. DEP’T. OF CORR., supra note 24, at 2. 
 99. Offender Relocation/Housing, Agreement between State of Cal. and Corr. 
Corp. of Am., Agreement No. C06.298-0 17 (2011). 
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anti-retroviral medications therapeutically indicated for the treatment 
of inmates with AIDS or HIV infection.”100
A 2008 contract between the Hawaii Department of Public Safety 
and Pinal County, to house prisoners at CCA-operated facilities in 
Arizona, states the company “shall not be responsible for the cost of 
medication or regimens specifically aimed at the treatment of 
conditions associated with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) and Hepatitis C.”
 
101  Identical language was included in a 
2008 contract between Hawaii and CCA to house female prisoners at 
the company’s Otter Creek Correctional Center in Kentucky.102  In 
FY 2009, Hawaii paid $6.37 million in medical costs not included in 
the per diem rates in its contracts to house prisoners at CCA 
facilities.103
Also, a 2009 contract between CCA and the Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee states 
that “[m]edical costs for AIDS . . . , oncology and dialysis treatments 
are considered reimbursable expenses”; i.e., the cost for treating 
prisoners with those conditions shall be paid by the Metro 
Government, not by CCA.
 
104
Sometimes the exclusion of certain medical expenses is not as 
obvious as the explicit contractual provisions cited above.  For 
example, a 2012 contract between the State of Idaho and CCA to 
house prisoners at the company’s Kit Carson Correctional Center 
includes “Option A” for healthcare services from the state’s RFP.  
Under Option A, “[t]he Contractor is solely responsible for all costs 
associated with provision of care as provided for within [subsections 
related to] Healthcare, Mental Health, and Dental Services.”
 
105
Thus, under Option A in the contract and RFP, it would appear 
that CCA is responsible for all medical-related costs, including 
expensive treatments for HIV and HCV. 
 
                                                                                                                             
 100. Contract between Dep’t of Corr., State of Tenn., and Corr. Corp. of Am. for 
the South Central Correctional Center, RFS-329.44-004 13 (2007).  This provision 
was not included in the superseding 2013 contract. 
 101. Contract between Dep’t of Pub. Safety, State of Haw., and Pinal County, 
Ariz., Contract No. 55331 18 (2008). 
 102. Contract between Dep’t of Pub. Safety, State of Haw., and Corr. Corp. of Am. 
for Otter Creek Correctional Center, Contract No. PSD 08-ID/MB24 16 (2008). 
 103. STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 51, at Exhibit A. 
 104. Management Services Contract between Corr. Corp. of Am. and the Metro. 
Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Contract No. 18612 26 (2009). 
 105. Contract Purchase Order between Dep’t of Corr., Idaho, and Corr. Corp. of 
Am., supra note 92, at 115. 
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That is not the case, however.  The contract incorporates the state’s 
responses to questions submitted by private prison companies during 
the RFP process, and those responses include: “[t}he IDOC does not 
anticipate sending Offenders with chronic healthcare and/or mental 
health issues to the Facility (to include HIV treatment or HCV 
treatment),”106 and “[t]he transfer criteria IDOC will use includes the 
following: 1. No chronic mental health or health care issues . . . .”107  
The RFP was amended to include “no chronic mental health or health 
care issues” as the “primary criteria in evaluating offenders” for 
placement at the CCA-operated prison.108
Thus, although CCA is responsible for “all costs associated with 
provision of care” under Option A in the contract and RFP, it is 
really only responsible for such costs based on the medical needs of 
the prisoners housed at the facility.  Since Idaho does not send 
prisoners with “chronic healthcare” conditions—including HIV and 
HCV—to the CCA prison, the company is not liable for those costs. 
 
2. Caps on Medical Costs 
Some private prison contracts include caps on certain medical 
expenses paid by the private prison company, based on specified 
dollar amounts or time limits. 
For example, a 2011 contract between CCA and the CDCR states 
that the CDCR will pay “[a]ll expenses in excess of $2,500 annually 
per inmate for medically necessary, off site hospital or emergency 
care.  This includes, but is not limited to medical, surgical, mental 
health, and dental care delivered in an Emergency Room, 
practitioner’s office, or inpatient or outpatient hospital setting.”109  A 
2013 contract between the State of Tennessee and CCA to operate 
the South Central Correctional Center specifies: “[i]f the inmate is 
hospitalized, the Contractor shall not be responsive for Inpatient-
Hospital Costs which exceed $4,000.00 per Inmate per admission.”110
                                                                                                                             
 106. Id. at 251 (responding to a question asking how many offenders with chronic 
healthcare or mental health issues will be transferred to the new facility). 
  
Hospitalization costs above the $4000 cap, no matter how expensive, 
 107. Id. at 248 (responding to a question asking what transfer criteria the IDOC 
will use to determine which offenders will be transferred to the new facility). 
 108. Id. at 27. 
 109. Offender Relocation/Housing, Agreement between State of Cal. and Corr. 
Corp. of Am., supra note 99, at 17. 
 110. Contract between Dep’t of Corr., State of Tenn., and Corr. Corp. of Am. for 
South Central Correctional Center, RFP-32944-00006 17 (2013). 
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are paid by the state.111  A 2010 contract between the State of Texas 
and MTC to operate the West Texas Intermediate Sanctions Facility 
provides that, “[i]f an Offender requires continued hospitalization 
after the initial forty-eight (48) hour period, the [Texas Department 
of Criminal Justice] shall be responsible for all reasonable and 
appropriate medical costs.”112
Both dollar amount and time limit caps were included in 2006–2007 
contracts between Florida and CCA to operate the Gadsden, South 
Bay, and Lake City correctional facilities.  The contracts all state: 
“The CONTRACTOR shall not be responsible for inpatient 
hospitalization costs, including any surgery and specialty services, in 
amounts greater than $15,000 per inmate per admission, or for costs 




In other cases, private prisons simply are not responsible for 
providing any medical services.  A 2011 contract between the State of 
Texas and CCA to manage the Bartlett State Jail provides that the 
Texas Department of Criminal Justice “will contract with the 
Correctional Managed Health Care Committee (CMHCC) to provide 
complete health care services including medical, dental, mental 
health, pharmaceutical, medical records, emergency care and sick call 
services for Offenders assigned to the Facility.”
  Notably, while medical care expenses may be capped for 
private prison companies, there is no cap on the amount public 
corrections agencies must pay for prisoner medical care. 
114  Similar provisions 
are included in the state’s 2010 contracts with CCA to operate the 
Bradshaw State Jail, Lindsey State Jail, and Willacy County State 
Jail.115
                                                                                                                             
 111. Id. 
 
 112. Solicitation, Offer and Award between State of Tex. and Management & 
Training Corp. for operation of the West Texas Intermediate Sanction Facility, 
Contract No. 696-PF-12-13-C029 28 (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.texas
prisonbidness.org/files/facilities/contracts/WestTexas2010.pdf. 
 113. See, e.g. Operations & Management Services Contract between State of Fla. 
and Corr. Corp. of Am. for Gadsden Correctional Facility, DMS Contract No. 06/07-
093 17 (2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/fdoc_
cca_contract_for_gadsden_facility_2009.pdf. 
 114. Solicitation, Offer and Award between Dep’t of Crim. Justice, State of Tex., 
and Corr. Corp. of Am. for operation of the Bartlett State Jail, Contract No. 696-PF-
11-13-C064 36 (Apr. 1, 2010).  The Correctional Managed Health Care Committee is 
a state agency that contracts with the University of Texas Medical Branch and Texas 
Tech University Health Sciences Center to provide medical care for state prisoners. 
See Correctional Managed Health Care, TEX. DEP’T CRIM. JUST., http://tdcj.state.tx.
us/divisions/cmhc/partner_agencies.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 115. See Solicitation, Offer and Award between Dep’t of Crim. Justice, State of 
Tex., and Corr. Corp. of Am. for operation of the Bradshaw State Jail, No. 686-PF-
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Removing medical services from private prison contracts usually 
results in lower contractual per diem rates.  However, it also shifts all 
medical expenses to the public agency, including costs associated with 
prisoners who have serious medical and mental health conditions. 
3. Prisoner Eligibility Criteria 
Some contracts go beyond exempting private prisons from costs 
associated with specified medical conditions, as discussed above, and 
exclude prisoners with certain conditions from even being housed at 
privately-operated facilities, or limit the number of such prisoners. 
For example, contracts between Florida and the GEO Group 
include restrictions on prisoners with specific medical and mental 
health classifications.  The FDOC assigns a health classification to 
each state prisoner ranging from M1 to M5 (plus M9 for those who 
are pregnant).116  Prisoners also receive a mental health grade, ranging 
from S1 to S6.117  According to the Florida Correctional Medical 
Authority, “[t]he number assigned to an inmate is based on the 
severity or acuity of the medical or mental health condition with one 
indicating the lowest level of need.”118  The state’s current contracts 
with the GEO Group to operate the Bay, Moore Haven, and 
Graceville correctional facilities include a population cap of 16% for 
prisoners with medical grade M3 (with a 2% variance), and 18% for 
those with mental health grade S3 (with a 5% variance).119  Florida’s 
2010 contract with the GEO Group to house prisoners at the 
Blackwater River Correctional Facility provides that no prisoners 
with medical grade M3 or mental health grade S3 will be sent to the 
prison, and only 2% of the population can be HIV-positive.120
                                                                                                                             
11-13-C063, at 36–37 (2010); Solicitation, Offer and Award between Dep’t of Crim. 
Justice, State of Tex., and Corr. Corp. of Am. for operation of the Lindsey State Jail, 
No. 696-PF-11-13-C061, at 36–37 (2010); Solicitation, Offer and Award between Dep’t 
of Crim. Justice, State of Tex., and Corr. Corp. of Am. for operation of the Willacy 
County State Jail, No. 696-PF-11-13-C060, at 36–37 (2010). 
 
 116. STATE OF FLA. CORR. MED. AUTH., 2012–2013 ANNUAL REPORT AND REPORT 
ON AGING INMATES 22 (2013), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/
pdfs/correctional_medical_authority_2012-2013_annual_report.pdf. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Operations and Management Service Contract, Bay Corr. Facility, Contract 
No. DMS 13/14-0009A (2014); Operations and Management Service Contract, Moore 
Haven Corr. Facility, Contract No. DMS 13/14-0009B (2014); Operations and 
Management Service Contract, Graceville Corr. Facility, Contract No. DMS 09/10-
052 (2010). 
 120. Operations and Management Service Contract, Blackwater River Corr. 
Facility, Contract No. DMS 09/10-053, Transfer Agreement 2 (2010). 
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Such provisions led Florida’s Office of Program Policy Analysis 
and Government Accountability (OPPAGA) to note that the state’s 
contracts with private prison companies do not 
[A]ssure that private prisons serve inmates with comparable medical 
and mental health conditions as those housed in public prisons . . . . 
As special needs inmates are more expensive to serve than other 
inmates, the difference in the populations of public and private 
prisons results in the state shouldering a greater proportion of the 
cost of housing these inmates.121
Consequently, OPPAGA said the statutory requirement that 




As another example of prisoners with certain medical conditions 
being excluded from private prisons, UC Berkeley researcher 
Christopher Petrella published an “open letter” to CCA in July 2014 
that addressed some of the shortcomings of the Hakim and 
Blackstone cost comparison study, with a focus on California (which 
accounts for around 12% of CCA’s total revenue).
 
123  According to 
Petrella, a number of policies serve to exclude expensive-to-
incarcerate California prisoners from being housed at out-of-state 
CCA facilities, including prisoners with certain medical and mental 
health conditions.124  Petrella found that 12% of prisoners held in 
state facilities had HCV, compared with 6.55% in CCA-operated 
prisons.125  Also, according to a May 5, 2014 letter from California 
Correctional Health Care Services, “HIV+ inmate-patients are not 
transferred outside of California.  If an inmate-patient is diagnosed 
with HIV+ [sic] while residing in an out-of-state institution they are 
returned to California as soon as possible.”126
                                                                                                                             
 121. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, WHILE 
DMS HAS IMPROVED MONITORING, IT NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN PRIVATE PRISON 
OVERSIGHT AND CONTRACTS, REPORT NO. 08-71 4–5 (2008), available at 
www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/oppaga_fl_audit_report_on_private_pri
son_monitoring_2008.pdf. 
  In addition, Petrella 
found that California prisoners with “High Health Risk Priority 1 & 
2” ratings comprised 11% of the state’s prison population, while those 
with a disability comprised 6%, those 65 years and older comprised 
 122. Id. at 5. 
 123. CHRISTOPHER PETRELLA, AN OPEN LETTER TO THE CORRECTIONS 
CORPORATION OF AMERICA (2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/assets/open_letter_to_cca_final.pdf. 
 124. Id. at 3. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 3, 8. 
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4.4%, and those designated “Mental Health EOP” [Enhanced 
Outpatient] comprised 4.2%.127  The percentage of California 
prisoners in those same categories housed at out-of-state privately-
operated prisons?  Zero.128
4. Combining Medical Cost-Shifting Factors 
 
Standing alone, contractual provisions that cap healthcare costs, 
exclude expenses for HIV and HCV treatment, and limit prisoners 
with specified medical conditions at private prisons shift a certain 
amount of medical costs to public contracting agencies.  When such 
provisions are combined, however, the costs increase accordingly. 
As an extreme example of cost-shifting related to medical 
expenses, a 2011 contract between CCA and the Vermont 
Department of Corrections (VTDOC) includes a cap on medical 
costs, restrictions on specified medical expenses, and exclusions for 
prisoners with certain medical and mental health conditions.129  The 
contract provides: “[t]he Contractor shall be responsible for inpatient 
hospital and surgery charges for the first Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20,000.00) in costs per inmate, per incident.  Thereafter, VTDOC 
shall be liable for all inpatient hospital and surgery charges.”130
At first blush, $20,000 for in-patient hospitalization and surgery 
sounds like a generous cap—unless the reader is familiar with the 
costs of medical care in the United States.  Consider that a California 




Also, for some of the most expensive medical procedures and 
treatment, the company does not have to pay anything pursuant to 
the following contractual provision: 
  More complex medical procedures are 
correspondingly more expensive—yet CCA’s maximum liability for 
hospitalization and surgery is capped at $20,000 per prisoner. 
Provided that the VTDOC is aware or has been notified prior to the 
hospitalization of the inmate, the Contractor shall not be responsible 
for inpatient hospitalization costs, including any surgery and 
specialty services, associated with the treatment of persons with 
known Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), as defined 
                                                                                                                             
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Contract for Services between Dep’t of Corr., State of Vt. and Corr. Corp. of 
Am., Contract No. 19863 (2011). 
 130. Id. at 38. 
 131. Study: Appendix Surgery Costs Differ Around U.S., CBS NEWS, Apr. 23, 
2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/study-appendix-surgery-costs-differ-around-us. 
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by the Center for Disease Control, organ transplants, renal dialysis, 
cancer treatment and Hep C treatment.  The Contractor shall be 
responsible for inpatient and outpatient hospitalization costs for 
HIV infected patients, as noted above when not associated with 
treatment of their HIV disease.  The Contractor shall not be 
responsible for the cost of providing AZT, or other medications 
therapeutically indicated for the treatment of inmates with AIDS or 
HIV infection.  Such treatment will be at the VTDOC’s discretion 
and expense and requires pre-authorization.  The VTDOC will 
screen all transfers to exclude inmates currently being treated for 
active AIDS, cancer, renal dialysis and Hep C.132
But what about prisoners with serious mental health conditions?  
The contract covers that too, by minimizing costs to CCA.  “Vermont 
Department of Corrections agrees to review the mental health needs 
and stability of all inmates proposed for placement with CCA 
facilities,” the contract states.
 
133  “CCA may request the prompt 
return to Vermont of any inmate whose mental health cannot be 
readily maintained while out of state.”134  Further, the state is 
responsible for the cost of prosthetics: “With the prior approval by 
the Vermont Health Services Director Contractor shall provide 
prosthetic devices to inmates as medically indicated . . . .  The costs 
associated with providing prosthetics shall be borne by the State.”135
Therefore, costs associated with hospital and surgery expenses 
above the $20,000 cap, as well as costs related to prisoners who have 
HIV, HCV, and cancer, or who require dialysis or organ transplants, 
or have serious mental health conditions, plus the cost of prosthetics, 
are all shifted to the public sector. 
 
D. Transportation Costs 
The cost of transporting prisoners to and from privately-operated 
facilities is sometimes paid by the public agency rather than the 
private prison company.  For example, a 2010 contract between 
Florida and MTC for operation of the Gadsden Correctional Institute 
provides: “The CONTRACTOR shall not be responsible for inmate 
transportation from the [FDOC] to the Facility or from the Facility to 
the inmate’s destination upon transfer except as provided for in 
                                                                                                                             
 132. Contract for Services between Dep’t of Corr., State of Vt. and Corr. Corp. of 
Am., supra note 129, at 39 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. at 35. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 33. 
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Section 5.13 [related to specific types of transfers].”136  Also, a 2013 
contract between the Tennessee Department of Correction and CCA 
to house prisoners at the South Central Correctional Facility specifies 
that, “[t]he Department will be responsible for all other Inmate 
transportation via connection at Turney Center Industrial Complex 
[the closest state prison] for Department-mandated moves of prisoner 
groups for assignment purposes.”137  Transportation costs may be 
minimal, particularly when prisoners are moved to facilities within the 
same state.  However, consider that over 10,500 prisoners are housed 
in out-of-state private prisons, according to a 2013 report by 
Grassroots Leadership.138
Who pays for these more expensive interstate transportation costs?  
According to a 2008 contract between the Hawaii Department of 
Public Safety and Pinal County to house prisoners at CCA facilities in 
Arizona, “[t]he STATE shall be responsible for the cost of 
transporting Inmates to and from the STATE.”
  Prisoners from California, Idaho, Vermont, 
and Hawaii are held in CCA-operated facilities in other states, and 
are transferred back and forth via ground transportation or airplane. 
139  Similar language 
was included in a 2008 contract between Hawaii and CCA to house 
prisoners at the company’s Otter Creek Correctional Center in 
Kentucky.140  A 2011 contract between California and CCA states that 
“CDCR shall reimburse CONTRACTOR for the cost of transporting 
offenders between the transfer point in California and Facility, and 
between Facility and transfer point in California . . . .”141  Those costs 
include “cost of airframe and crew,” as well as expenses associated 
with CCA transportation officers, including the “cost of salary and 
fringe benefits for each guard accompanying the transportation of 
offenders,” plus CCA “shall be entitled [to] administrative overhead 
on said amounts calculated for guarding at a rate of 15%.”142
                                                                                                                             
 136. Operations & Management Services Contract between State of Fla. and Corr. 
Corp. of Am. for Gadsden Correctional Facility, supra note 113, at 19. 
 
 137. Contract between Dep’t of Corr., State of Tenn., and Corr. Corp. of Am. for 
South Central Correctional Center, supra note 110, at 19. 
 138. GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, LOCKED UP & SHIPPED AWAY: INTERSTATE 
PRISONER TRANSFERS AND THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY (2013), available at 
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/locked_up_shipped_away.p
df. 
 139. Contract between Dep’t of Pub. Safety, State of Haw., and Pinal County, 
Ariz., supra note 101, at 2. 
 140. Contract between Dep’t of Pub. Safety, State of Haw., and Corr. Corp. of Am. 
for Otter Creek Correctional Center., supra note 102, at 2. 
 141. Offender Relocation/Housing, Agreement between State of Cal. and Corr. 
Corp. of Am., supra note 99, at 7. 
 142. Id. 
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Such costs can be substantial.  According to a 2009 report by the 
Hawaii Department of Public Safety, transportation expenses for 
sending prisoners to and from private prisons on the mainland totaled 
$1,506,144 in FY 2009 alone.143
E. Prisoner Labor Costs 
  Particularly with regard to interstate 
transfers to private prisons, the shifting of transportation costs to 
public agencies can be significant. 
Most correctional facilities rely on prisoner labor to perform 
essential functions such as kitchen, laundry, janitorial, maintenance, 
clerical, and grounds keeping services.  While private prison 
companies benefit from prisoners’ labor, the wages that prisoners 
receive are sometimes paid or reimbursed by the contracting public 
agency. 
Pursuant to a 2008 contract between the Hawaii Department of 
Public Safety and Pinal County to house prisoners at CCA facilities in 
Arizona, “[t]he State shall reimburse the [private prison contractor] 
for Inmate pay, which amount shall be included as a separate item on 
the monthly invoice.”144  Identical language was included in a 2008 
contract to house Hawaii prisoners at a CCA-operated facility in 
Kentucky.145  At immigration detention centers, private prison 
contractors benefit from detainees employed in “voluntary” work 
programs.146  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
reimburses private contractors for wages paid to such detainees, at 
the rate of $1.00 per day for each worker.147  For example, a 2010 
Intergovernmental Service Agreement between ICE and Karnes 
County, Texas, to house detainees at the GEO Group-operated 
Karnes County Civil Detention Center states that in addition to the 
per diem rate, ICE will provide compensation of one dollar a day for 
“Detainee Work Program Reimbursement.”148
Prisoners’ wages, while typically paltry, add up due to the number 
of prisoners who work each day, year after year.  According to a 2009 
 
                                                                                                                             
 143. STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 51, at Exhibit A. 
 144. Contract between Dep’t of Pub. Safety, State of Haw., and Pinal County, 
Ariz., supra note 101, at 14. 
 145. Contract between Dep’t of Pub. Safety, State of Haw., and Corr. Corp. of Am. 
for Otter Creek Correctional Center., supra note 102, at 12. 
 146. See Ian Urbina, Using Jailed Migrants as a Pool of Cheap Labor, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/using-jailed-migrants-as-a-pool-
of-cheap-labor.html. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Intergovernmental Service Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement and Karnes Cnty., EROIGSA-11-004 2 (2010). 
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Hawaii Department of Public Safety report, the cost for wages paid to 
prisoners held at CCA facilities in FY 2009 was $607,344—a cost 
shifted to the state, while CCA benefited from the prisoner labor.149  
According to Professor Jacqueline Stevens at Northwestern 
University, as a result of cut-rate detainee labor costs at immigration 
detention facilities, private contractors achieve substantial savings—
though when detainee wages are reimbursed by ICE, those savings 
come at a cost that is shifted to the public sector.150  Using the 
minimum wage to calculate the relative value of detainee labor at 
privately-operated immigration detention centers, Professor Stevens 
found that “[f]or 2012, GEO brought in an estimated $33 to $72 
million profits from labor savings, and CCA an estimated $30 to [$66] 
million from its labor savings, or about 25% of the company’s total 
profits.”151
Public prisons use prisoner labor, too, of course.  But if private 
prisons had to pay for the prisoner labor they use and from which 
they benefit, their operating costs would be higher.  Instead, expenses 
related to prisoners’ wages are sometimes shifted to the public 
contracting agency. 
 
F. Administrative Overhead 
According to one study, administrative overhead costs at 
correctional facilities range from eight to twenty percent,152
Even when prisoners are housed at privately-operated facilities, 
there are certain functions that still must be performed by public 
officials.  These administrative overhead duties, sometimes called 
central office functions, include, among others: 
 and not 
all of those costs can be shifted to private prison contractors. 
 Calculating prisoners’ sentences and applying good time 
credits; 
 Recordkeeping related to prisoners’ institutional files and/or 
trust fund accounts; 
 Intake and initial classification for prisoners entering the prison 
system; 
 Reviewing grievance appeals; 
                                                                                                                             
 149. STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 51, at Exhibit A. 
 150. See generally Jacqueline Stevens, One Dollar Per Day: The Slaving Wages of 
Immigration Jail Work Programs (Working Paper v. 2, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2434006. 
 151. Id. at 11. 
 152. GAES, supra note 2, at 18. 
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 Reviewing and/or approving disciplinary decisions by private 
prison employees; 
 Planning, procurement and budget development related to 
private prison contracts, including the development of RFPs 
and evaluation of bids by private prison companies; 
 Parole hearings and parole-related services; and 
 Responding to public records requests. 
These tasks require the expenditure of staff time and resources by 
public contracting agencies, and therefore should be factored into 
cost comparisons.153
                                                                                                                             
 153. These are all functions typically performed by public corrections agencies.  
Private prisons do not calculate prisoners’ sentences or good time credits; prisoner 
record-keeping and trust fund accounts are usually maintained by Departments of 
Correction through a centralized computer system.  When prisoners enter the prison 
system they go through a classification process, including medical and mental health 
screening and security classification, which is conducted at a public reception facility 
before prisoners are transferred to private prisons.  For example, in the Tennessee 
Department of Correction (TDOC), which contracts with CCA to house state 
prisoners at three facilities, “[a]ll sentence computations, including calculation of 
Inmate release and parole dates, shall be done by the Department . . . .” Contract 
between Dep’t of Corr., State of Tenn., and Corr. Corp. of Am. for South Central 
Correctional Center, supra, note 110, at 22.  The TDOC uses a computer system 
called TOMIS to manage information about offenders, and “[a]ll computer 
equipment and communication lines necessary to interface with the Department’s . . . 
(TOMIS) will be provided by the Department at no cost to the Contractor.” Id. at 3, 
23.  The TDOC’s intake/reception facility is the Bledsoe County Correctional 
Complex (BCCX), which “is the intake diagnostic center for all male offenders 
sentence [sic] to the [TDOC].  All offenders receive a comprehensive diagnostic 
assessment which will determine their medical, mental health and programming 
needs.” Bledsoe County Correctional Complex, TENN. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS, 
www.tn.gov/correction/institutions/bccx.shtml (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).  BCCX is 
operated by the state, which bears the cost of all intake and diagnostic services. See 
id.  While private prisons have their own grievance and disciplinary procedures, 
grievance and disciplinary appeals are usually handled by public prison officials. See, 
e.g., Mandela v. Campbell, 978 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1998).  Parole hearings and related 
services are provided by public agencies—there are no privatized parole boards.  
With respect to public records laws, most state public records statutes do not 
specifically extend to private prison companies, and the federal Freedom of 
Information Act only applies to federal government agencies, not to private 
contractors. See Mel Motel, Reintroducing the Private Prison Information Act: An 
Interview, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
news/2013/feb/15/reintroducing-the-private-prison-information-act-an-interview. 
   Additionally, most private prisons are subject to 
monitoring by public corrections officials.  In some cases those 
expenses are paid by the private prison company, while in others the 
public contracting agency is wholly or partially responsible for the 
cost of monitoring.  A 2012 contract between the State of Idaho and 
CCA to house Idaho prisoners at the company’s Kit Carson 
Correctional Center in Colorado provides that CCA will pay for the 
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monitor’s salary and benefits.  However, the state “is responsible for 
all costs associated with the IDOC Contract Monitor other than 
salary and benefits,” including expenses, travel and lodging.154
Costs associated with private prison monitoring may be minimal, 
such as when one or two employees are assigned to oversee one 
facility.  But in other cases state prison systems have an entire 
department devoted to private prison contract monitoring and 
compliance, such as the Mainland/FDC Branch of the Hawaii 
Department of Public Safety,
  In this 
case, travel and lodging costs are higher than usual as the prisoners 
are housed at an out-of-state facility. 
155 the Private Facility Contract 
Monitoring/Oversight Division of the Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice (TDCJ),156 and Florida’s former Correctional Privatization 
Commission.157
As of 2010, California’s Contract Beds Unit (CBU) reportedly had 
seventy-three staff members assigned to monitor out-of-state private 
prisons—an usually high number with a correspondingly higher cost 
to the state.
 
158  According to the CBU, monitoring costs are paid by 
the state and not by the private contractors.159  The CBU’s proposed 
budget for FY 2014–2015 was $398,284, representing costs shifted to 
the public sector for private prison monitoring.160
Finally, public agencies sometimes must absorb administrative 
costs related to litigation involving private prisons, such as when both 
private prison officials and state officials are named as defendants in 
lawsuits.  A 2013 report by Hawaii’s state Auditor noted that state 
prison officials were not including litigation expenses when 
 
                                                                                                                             
 154. Contract Purchase Order between Dep’t of Corr., Idaho, and Corr. Corp. of 
Am., supra note 92, at 237. 
 155. See STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 51. 
 156. See Private Facility Contract Monitoring/Oversight Division, TEX. 
DEPARTMENT CRIM. JUST., http://tdcj.state.tx.us/divisions/pf/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2014). 
 157. Florida’s Correctional Privatization Commission was abolished in May 2004, 
the same month that the agency’s director, Alan Duffee, resigned. See Joni James, 
Ex-Prisons Official Admits Thefts, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, 
http://www.sptimes.com/2006/02/14/Tampabay/Ex_prisons_official_a.shtml.  Duffee 
pleaded guilty to embezzling almost $225,000 from a maintenance fund set up for 
private prisons and was sentenced to thirty-three months in federal prison. See id. 
 158. HAKIM & BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 31. 
 159. Telephone Interview with Lt. Shawn Simpson, Pub. Info. Officer, CBU (Aug. 
5, 2014). 
 160. 5225 Corrections and Rehabilitation, CAL. GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2014–2015, 
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2014-15/StateAgencyBudgets/5210/5225/department.html 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2014).  Note: The CBU also oversees in-state contract facilities. 
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calculating private prison-related costs.  “[T]hese costs, if included, 
would have the biggest impact on per capita costs for housing inmates 
in out-of-state facilities, since the biggest lawsuits involve these 
facilities,” the Auditor wrote.161
One researcher has noted that even when private prison companies 
indemnify the public agencies with which they contract, costs of 
litigation absorbed by the companies may be passed on to those 
agencies through cost increases when the contracts are renewed or 
rebid: “[l]itigation expenses, settlement agreements, and adverse 
court judgments against private prison operators and their employees 
augment the Government’s expenses by way of contract pricing 
increases and a higher degree of liability exposure than would exist 
under a purely public system.”
 
162
Other litigation expenses are incurred by the public sector when 
private prison companies sue government agencies, such as after a 
contentious contract termination.  Examples include when CCA filed 
suit against Hernando County, Florida, in 2010 over a dispute about 
deferred maintenance and repairs at the county jail,
 
163 and when GEO 
Group unsuccessfully sued Michigan officials for $5.4 million after the 
state canceled its contract to house offenders at the GEO-operated 
North Lake Correctional Facility.164  In the latter regard, according to 
a 2012 report released by public employee unions, GEO Group “sued 
the state to keep the facility open—or continue to make lease 
payments even if it were empty.  GEO pursued the claim through 
complaint after amended complaint, litigating it all the way up to the 
Supreme Court of Michigan.”165
                                                                                                                             
 161. HAW. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR, supra note 37, at 47. 
 
 162. Lucas Anderson, Note, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy 
Arguments for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 113, 131–32 
(2009). 
 163. Complaint, Corr. Corp. of Am. v. Hernando County (M.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 
8:10-cv-02182), 2010 WL 4018750; see also Barbara Behrendt, Former Hernando 
County Jail Operator CCA Sues Over Money, Equipment, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Sept. 
30, 2010, http://www.tampabay.com/news/localgovernment/former-hernando-county-
jail-operator-cca-sues-over-money-equipment/1125116. 
 164. GEO Group v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 273466, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 
1658 (Mich. Ct. App. June 21, 2007). 
 165. MICH. CORR. ORG., PITFALLS AND PROMISES: THE REAL RISKS TO RESIDENTS 
AND TAXPAYERS OF PRIVATIZING PRISONS AND PRISON SERVICES IN MICHIGAN 10 
(2012), available at http://www.mco-seiu.org/files/2012/02/MCO-Private-Prison-
Report-v8.pdf. 
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G. Law Enforcement and Criminal Prosecutions 
Private prison contracts often include reimbursement provisions 
for costs incurred by public law enforcement agencies due to escapes 
from or riots at privately-operated facilities.  One shortcoming of such 
provisions, however, is that they may only apply to the parties to the 
contract.  Thus, for example, if a state contracts with CCA and state 
employees assist in searching for an escapee from the CCA-operated 
facility, then the state can seek reimbursement for those costs.  But if 
a county sheriff’s office, city police department, or other public law 
enforcement agency assists in the search, reimbursements for those 
costs might not be covered by the contract.  Contractual provisions 
may also limit reimbursements to public agencies. 
A 2011 contract between CCA and the State of Vermont specifies 
that “[a]ny reasonable and actual costs up to $50,000.00 incurred by 
VTDOC in connection with any escape and or rendition and 
extradition process shall be chargeable to and borne by 
Contractor.”166  Costs above the $50,000 cap are shifted to the state, 
and the contract does not address costs incurred by federal or local 
law enforcement agencies—only by the VTDOC.167
Further, public agencies may incur expenses related to escapes 
from privately-operated facilities located in other jurisdictions.  The 
high-profile escape of three prisoners from an MTC-managed facility 
in Kingman, Arizona, in July 2010 serves as an instructive example.  
The escapees, Tracy Province, Daniel Renwick, and John McCluskey, 
were eventually captured—one (plus an accomplice) in Arizona, one 
in Colorado, and one in Wyoming.
 
168  While on the run they had 
murdered a couple, Gary and Linda Haas, in New Mexico.169  The 
escape resulted in a three-week nationwide manhunt involving dozens 
of law enforcement agencies.170  While news reports indicated that 
MTC had reimbursed some of the costs associated with the escape,171
                                                                                                                             
 166. Contract for Services between Dep’t of Corr., State of Vt. and Corr. Corp. of 
Am., supra note 129, at 28. 
 
it is highly unlikely that all of the law enforcement agencies that 
 167. Id. 
 168. Bob Ortega, Arizona Prisons Slow to Fix Flaws in Wake of Kingman Escape, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC (June 26, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/06/26/
20110626arizona-prison-safety-improvements.html. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Jayne Hanson, County Reimbursed for Prison Break Costs, TODAY’S NEWS-
HERALD (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.havasunews.com/news/county-reimbursed-for-
prison-break-costs/article_fed1b958-3c25-55c8-8aa9-5cc0fdf43ab6.html. 
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participated in the nationwide search, including the FBI, recovered 
their costs from the company. 
The externalized cost of criminal prosecutions resulting from 
incidents at private prisons is another cost-shifting factor often 
overlooked in public-private prison cost comparisons.  To continue 
with the example of the 2010 escape from the MTC-operated facility 
in Arizona, following their capture the three escapees were 
prosecuted in federal court in New Mexico for a number of crimes, 
including the murders of Gary and Linda Haas.172  Prosecutors sought 
the death penalty against McCluskey;173 death penalty cases are the 
most expensive types of prosecutions.174  McCluskey and Province 
were sentenced to life, while Renwick received a forty-eight year 
sentence in Colorado.175  Their accomplice, Casslyn Welch, was 
sentenced to forty years in federal prison.176  The costs of prosecuting 
the escapees, as well as their future incarceration costs (including life 
sentences for two of the defendants), were shifted to public agencies; 
MTC was not held responsible for those costs even though gross 
security lapses by the company had contributed to the escape.177
In another case, after a prisoner escaped from a CCA-operated 
prison in Mississippi in 2009, the escapee and an accomplice shot a 
Tennessee police officer, Mark Chesnut, five times during a traffic 
stop.
 
178  They were prosecuted in Tennessee and sentenced to forty-
five and thirty-one years in prison, respectively.179
                                                                                                                             
 172. See Scott Sandlin, 40 Years for Woman’s Role in Murders, ALBUQUERQUE J., 
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Mississippi. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See Financial Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
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 175. See Sandline, supra note 172. 
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https://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/adoc-report-on-kingman-
escapes.pdf. 
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than $14 Million, TENNESSEAN, Oct. 30, 2009, available at http://www.hollins
legal.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/mark-chesnut-officer-shot.pdf. 
 179. Brian Hass, Former Metro Police Sgt. Mark Chesnut Settles Suit in Prison 
Break Case, TENNESSEAN, Sept. 14, 2011, available at http://www.hollinslegal.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Former-Metro-Police-Sgt.-Mark-Chesnut-settles-suit-in-
prison-break-case.pdf. 
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Further, Hawaii prisoner Bronson Nunuha was murdered at the 
CCA-operated Saguaro Correctional Center in Arizona in February 
2010.180  The two prisoners who killed him, Miti Maugaotega, Jr. and 
Micah Kanahele, were prosecuted by Arizona officials, who initially 
sought the death penalty.181  Four months after Nunuha was 
murdered, another Hawaii prisoner at Saguaro, Clifford Medina, was 
killed by his cellmate, Mahina Uli Silva.182  Silva also was prosecuted 
in Arizona and initially faced the death penalty.183
As indicated by the above examples, the costs of prosecuting 
prisoners who commit serious offenses at privately-operated facilities 
are shifted to public agencies, as are incarceration costs resulting from 
those prosecutions—even when the offenses are due to security lapses 
by private prison companies. 
  The County 
Attorney’s Office assumed prosecution costs, and, although both 
murders involved Hawaii prisoners at a CCA facility, the future 
incarceration expenses for Maugaeotega, Kanahele, and Silva will be 
funded by Arizona taxpayers. 
H. Bed Guarantees 
According to a September 2013 report by In the Public Interest 
(ITPI) titled Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and ‘Low-Crime Taxes’ 
Guarantee Profits for Private Prison Corporations, forty-one of the 
sixty-two private prison contracts surveyed in the report (around 
65%) contained minimum occupancy “bed guarantee” provisions.  
Such provisions ensure that private prison companies receive per 
diem payments for a minimum percentage of beds at a facility—even 
if they are not being used.184  The bed guarantees identified in the 
ITPI report ranged from 80 to 100%; for example, three private 
prison contracts in Arizona included 100% bed guarantees, while 
three in Oklahoma had 98% guarantees.185
                                                                                                                             
 180. See Gregg K. Kakesako, Third Hawaii Inmate Faces Death Penalty in 
Arizona, HONOLULU STAR ADVERTISER (Sept. 4, 2010), 
http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/20100904_third_hawaii_inmate_faces_death_pen
alty_in_arizona.html?id=102211349. 
  The most common bed 
guarantee was 90%, and all three of the nation’s largest private prison 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, CRIMINAL: HOW LOCKUP QUOTAS AND “LOW-CRIME 
TAXES” GUARANTEE PROFITS FOR PRIVATE PRISON CORPORATIONS (2013), available 
at http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/default/files/Criminal-Lockup%20Quota-
Report.pdf. 
 185. Id. at 14–16. 
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firms—CCA, the GEO Group, and MTC—utilized bed guarantee 
provisions in their contracts.186
In some cases bed guarantees have resulted in cost-shifting by 
private prisons, as public agencies were required to pay for unused or 
unneeded bed space.  As one example, following the 2010 escape 
from an MTC-run prison in Arizona described above, state officials 
removed hundreds of high-risk prisoners from the facility as a security 
precaution.
 
187  However, MTC filed a claim against the state based on 
a 97% bed guarantee in its contract, and Arizona ended up paying the 
company more than $3 million for empty beds at the prison.188
Also, The Tennessean reported that a 90% bed guarantee for 
female prisoners at the CCA-operated Metro-Davidson County 
Detention Facility in Nashville had cost taxpayers over $487,000 for 
vacant beds from 2011 to 2013.
 
189
Even when private prison contracts do not include bed guarantees, 
that does not guarantee such provisions are inapplicable.  According 
to the ITPI report, Colorado officials agreed to pay CCA $20,000 
each for at least 3300 prisoners during FY 2013, even though there 
were available beds at state facilities that could have accommodated 
some of those prisoners—and even though the state’s contracts with 
CCA specified that “the state does not guarantee any minimum 
number of offenders will be assigned to the contractor’s facility.”
 
190
This end-run around the contractual language was achieved after 
“CCA negotiated the insertion of a bed guarantee provision in the 
state budget for all three of its facilities [in Colorado] for the 2013 
fiscal year.”
 
191  How was the company able to accomplish this 
legislative sleight of hand?  By cutting a deal with state officials for 
the bed guarantees in exchange for CCA agreeing not to close one of 
its facilities, as it had threatened.192
                                                                                                                             
 186. Id. 
  “CCA has said that if we don’t 
figure something out, they will be in a situation where they have to 
close a prison,” stated Roxane White, chief of staff for Colorado 
 187. Id. at 9. 
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 189. See TN Taxpayers Pay $500K for Empty Prison Beds in Quota Contract, 
CRIME REP. (Oct. 11, 2013, 5:51 P.M.), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/crime-
and-justice-news/2013-10-tn-funding-empty-prison-beds. 
 190. Ann Imse, Colorado Paying Millions for Unneeded Private Prisons, COLO. 
PUB. NEWS (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.cpt12.org/news/index.php/colorado-paying-
millions-for-unneeded-private-prisons; see also IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 
184, at 7–8. 
 191. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 184, at 7–8. 
 192. Id. 
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Governor John Hickenlooper, in a March 10, 2013 news report.193  
“The General Assembly and the governor agreed to have a year 
where no other communities were affected by a prison 
closure,” added Eric Brown, a spokesman for the governor’s office.194  
The cost for both the private prison beds and maintaining the unused 
bed space in public prisons—estimated at $2 million—was shifted to 
the state.195
Bed guarantees can also have a significant impact on long-term 
costs, as private prison contracts may extend up to twenty years.  As 
part of Ohio’s 2011 sale of the Lake Erie Correctional Institution to 
CCA, state officials agreed to a twenty-year lease agreement that 
includes per diem rates, an annual ownership fee, and a 90% bed 
guarantee.
 
196  In the latter regard, if Ohio’s prison population drops 
over the next two decades, and the state no longer needs to house 
offenders at the CCA facility—or decides to expand the use of less 
costly sanctions such as community corrections or supervised 
release—it still must fill 90% of Lake Erie’s 1800 beds pursuant to the 
bed guarantee provision in its contract with the company.197
In February 2012, CCA sent letters to the governors in forty-eight 
states, offering to purchase state prisons under similar conditions, 
with 90% bed guarantees and twenty-year terms.
 
198
Public prisons, of course, do not have bed guarantees because they 




I. Long-Term Costs 
 
Comparisons between public and privately-operated prisons often 
focus on short-term expenses and may neglect the following long-
term cost-shifting factors: (1) per diem increases; (2) deferred 
maintenance; (3) recidivism rates; and (4) expenses related to bond 
financing. 
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1. Per Diem Increases 
The per diem rates specified in private prison contracts often 
increase over time as a result of contractually-required annual cost 
adjustments.  For example, a 2012 article in The Spokesman-Review 
reported that Idaho’s budget for private prisons was expected to 
increase pursuant to “a contract requirement that per-inmate 
payments to the Corrections Corporation of America, which operates 
the Idaho Correctional Center south of Boise for the state, rise by 3 
percent next year.”200  “This is all on contract, and this is the rate 
which is in the contract,” said State Rep. Darrell Bolz.201  According 
to The Spokesman-Review: “Rep. Diane Bilyeu, D-Pocatello, noted 
that after the increase, the daily rate per inmate of $42.73 for the first 
1,894 inmates [held at the CCA-run facility] will be slightly higher 
than the state’s rate to house state inmates in county jails.”202
In fact, escalating per diem rates in private prison contracts are 
fairly common.  Pursuant to a 2013 contract between the Tennessee 
Department of Correction and CCA to operate the South Central 
Correctional Center, the per diem rate that CCA receives increases 
from $45.69 in 2013–2014, to $46.70 in 2014–2015, then to $47.73 in 
2015–2016, to $48.78 in 2016–2017, and finally to $49.85 in 2017–2018 
(the latter two increases only apply if the contract is extended).
 
203  
This represents an increase of 9.1% over the potential five-year 
contract period, from a total annual contract amount of $27.38 million 
in 2013–2014 to $29.87 million in 2017–2018.204
Similarly, per diem payments escalate in a 2009 contract between 
CCA and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson 
County.  The contract specifies per diem costs of $43.36 per male 
prisoner and $46.42 per female prisoner for the first year, increasing 




A 2011 contract between CCA and the State of Vermont provides 
that in the first year, the state will pay a per diem of $61.72 per 
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2012/mar/05/prison-budget-set-includes-3-increase-private-prison-firm-cca. 
 201. Id. 
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 203. Contract between Dep’t of Corr., State of Tenn., and Corr. Corp. of Am. for 
South Central Correctional Center, supra note 110, at 1, 28. 
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 205. Management Services Contract between Corr. Corp. of Am. and the Metro. 
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prisoner housed at CCA’s Lee Adjustment Center in Kentucky and 
$68.00 per prisoner held at the company’s Florence Correctional 
Center in Arizona.206  Those rates rise incrementally to $67.43 and 
$74.30, respectively, in year four of the contract—a 9.25% increase.207
The State of Texas contracts with CCA to operate a number of 
correctional facilities, and a 2010 contract to manage the Bartlett 
State Jail is representative of such agreements.  That contract, which 
includes optional extensions to 2017, provides for a per diem rate of 
$28.66 for a state jail offender during the first year, increasing to 
$29.23 in year three under the base term of the contract, then to 
$31.64 in the final extension year—or an almost 10.4% increase over 
the full contract term, including extensions.
 
208
Similar provisions are included in the state’s 2010 contracts with 
CCA to operate the Bradshaw State Jail, Lindsey State Jail, and 
Willacy County State Jail—all of which include per diem increases of 
approximately 10.3% over the full contract term.
 
209
While costs at public prisons may increase over time, such as due to 
inflation, they also may decrease—for example, as a result of 
declining populations.  According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, beginning in 2009 the total state prison 
population in the United States began a very gradual decline, and 
twenty-eight states reported prison population reductions from 2011 
to 2012.
  Thus, the 
contractual costs for private prisons are not fixed but tend to increase 
over time, which might not be reflected in short-term or “snapshot” 
cost comparison studies. 
210
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2. Deferred Maintenance 
Another long-term cost is deferred maintenance by private prison 
companies that manage, but do not own, correctional facilities.  When 
CCA decided in 2010 to terminate its contract with Hernando 
County, Florida, to operate the county’s jail, local officials found the 
facility was in need of significant repairs due to deferred maintenance 
by the company.211  CCA had managed the jail for twenty-two 
years.212  “If they had performed routine maintenance as they should 
have and as their contract required,” said Major Michael Page with 
the Hernando County Sheriff’s Office, “this building would look [ten] 
times better.”213
Maintenance problems at the jail included “rusted doors, windows 
discolored and compromised by long-term water damage, cracked 
walls and floors, ceiling tiles and walls bubbled and stained by leaks 
from a faulty roof.”
 
214  According to an engineering report 
commissioned by the county, CCA was responsible for almost $1 
million in repairs due to deferred maintenance.215
County officials withheld a $1.86 million final payment pending 
resolution of the repair work at the jail, and CCA filed suit against 
the county.
 
216  The case settled in 2012, with the company paying only 
$100,000.217  The county had to absorb the remainder of the repair 
costs.218
3. Recidivism Rates 
 
A different type of long-term cost rarely addressed in comparisons 
of public and privately-operated prisons relates to recidivism rates,219
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and one researcher has argued that, “[i]ncreased criminal recidivism 
among inmates in private institutions presents perhaps the largest 
hidden financial cost of privatization.”220  At best, prior research has 
found that private prisons have no better recidivism outcomes than 
their public counterparts; at worst, based on recent studies, recidivism 
rates are higher at private prisons—meaning prisoners released from 
such facilities are more likely to be reincarcerated, resulting in 
significant cost-shifting from private prison companies to the public 
sector over the long term.221
Beginning in 1999, a series of studies in Florida examined the 
recidivism rates of offenders held in both public and privately-
operated prisons.  The initial studies, which had various 
methodological weaknesses, concluded that private prisons achieved 
lower recidivism rates.
 
222  The final study, jointly conducted by the 
Florida Department of Corrections, Florida State University, and 
Florida’s Correctional Privatization Commission, and published in 
2005, was “the most rigorous” of the Florida recidivism reports.223  
The final study found there was little difference in recidivism rates 
between public and privately-operated facilities.224  “In summary, in 
only one of thirty-six comparisons was there evidence that private 
prisons were more effective than public prisons in terms of reducing 
recidivism,” the authors concluded in a December 2003 version of the 
study posted on the FDOC’s website.225
A January 2011 joint study by the University of Hawaii and 
Hawaii’s Attorney General examined recidivism rates for 660 
prisoners who were paroled after serving time both in public prisons 
and in privately-operated facilities on the mainland.
 
226
                                                                                                                             
comparison would involve public and privately-operated facilities that offer similar 
rehabilitative programs. 
  The study 
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found the recidivism rate for parolees from state prisons was 56% 
compared with 53% for those from private prisons; however, that 
finding was “not statistically significant.”227  Further, there were 
differences between the two prisoner cohorts, including with respect 
to gender and type of commitment offense, and the study did not 
examine recidivism rates for prisoners who completed their sentences 
and were released from public and private prisons without being 
placed on parole.  The report concluded, “[s]ince there is no empirical 
justification for the policy argument that private prisons reduce 
recidivism better than public prisons, the State of Hawaii should 
decide whether to continue, discontinue, expand, or contract its 
reliance on private prisons based on other criteria.”228
Other research has reached opposite conclusions.  A July 2003 
study of for-profit, non-profit, and public juvenile correctional 
facilities in Florida, published by the Economic Growth Center at 
Yale University, determined that “for-profit management has a 
statistically significant impact on recidivism as measured by both 1-
year recidivism rates (approximately 5 to 8 percent higher than the 
other management types in terms of adjudications and charges) and 
by daily hazard rates (approximately 13 to 19 percent higher),” 
relative to non-profit and public facilities.
 
229
Further, a 2008 study of Oklahoma prisoners in public and private 
prisons found “a significantly greater hazard of recidivism among 
private prison inmates in six of the eight models tested . . . .  In every 
categorical model (including the two that were non-significant), 
private prison inmate groups had a greater hazard of recidivism than 
did public inmate groups.”
 
230  The study noted that the more time a 
prisoner spent at a private facility, the greater the hazard of 
recidivism; conversely, the more time served at a public prison, the 
lower the hazard of recidivism—though the effects were modest.231
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The study, which controlled for prisoners’ age, education, race, prior 
incarceration, offense type, discharge conditions, sentence length, 
time served, time spent in public and private prisons, and proportion 
of sentence served, concluded that prisoners held in private facilities 
were up to 16.7% more likely to recidivate.232
Most recently, the results of a 2013 study conducted by the 
Minnesota Department of Corrections indicated: 
 
[T]hat offenders who had been incarcerated in a private prison had a 
greater hazard of recidivism in all 20 models, and the recidivism risk 
was significantly greater in eight of the models.  The evidence 
presented in this study suggests that private prisons are not more 
effective in reducing recidivism, which may be attributable to fewer 
visitation and rehabilitative programming opportunities for 
offenders incarcerated at private facilities.233
To the extent that prisoners released from private prisons in fact 
have higher recidivism rates, cost comparisons of public and 
privately-operated facilities should examine the reincarceration 
expenses that result due to those higher rates—which represent costs 
shifted to the public sector over the long term.  Such costs can be 
substantial; according to a 2012 study by the Vera Institute of Justice, 
the average cost of incarceration is $31,286 per prisoner per year.
 
234
As noted in the 2003 study of Florida juvenile facilities: 
 
Relative to all other management types, for-profit management 
leads to a statistically significant increase in recidivism, but, relative 
to nonprofit and state-operated facilities, for-profit facilities operate 
at a lower cost to the government per comparable individual 
released.  Cost benefit analysis implies that the short-run savings 
offered by for-profit over nonprofit management are negated in the 
long run due to increased recidivism rates, even if one measures the 
benefits of reducing criminal activity as only the avoided costs of 
additional confinement.235
4. Bond Financing 
 
A final long-term cost-shifting factor involves the construction of 
jails to generate revenue for cities and towns.  Such projects usually 
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include municipal or private bond financing to build jails that are 
operated by private companies; the host town receives a portion of 
the revenue from housing prisoners at the facility.  Sometimes the 
projects are not successful, though, leaving public officials with empty 
jails, ongoing maintenance costs, and large bond or loan payments. 
Examples include the town of Hardin, Montana, which built the 
Two Rivers Detention Center that was supposed to be operated by 
Emerald Corrections and then by Civigenics, both private prison 
contractors, but which, until recently, has remained vacant since 
2007.236  Hardin defaulted on $27 million in bond payments and the 
bondholders took over the facility in 2013.237
The $10 million Bill Clayton Detention Center in Littlefield, Texas, 
remained empty for three years after the GEO Group pulled out in 
2009, leaving the city with monthly loan payments of $65,000.
 
238  City 
officials raised property taxes, increased water and sewage fees, fired 
employees to avoid defaulting, and used reserve funds to cover the 
payments.239  The facility remained vacant as of October 2014; 
meanwhile, the city’s bond rating has suffered.240
According to another report:  
 
Clayton, New Mexico issued $63 million in revenue bonds to 
contract with GEO to build a medium security, 625-bed institution 
to house mostly state inmates.  As prison populations declined, a 
study conducted for the Legislative Finance Committee reported 
that the actual cost of the prison will exceed the estimated 
construction cost of $61 million.  It estimated that over the course of 
twenty years, the state will pay $132 million in construction and 
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finance costs and still not own the building.  Of the $95.33 per diem 
inmate costs for housing, $27.81 will go toward construction costs.241
In such cases, the costs associated with maintenance for shuttered 
facilities, public funds used to cover bond payments, increased 
property taxes and other fees, and lowered bond ratings are shifted to 
the public sector when contracts with private prison companies do not 
work out. 
 
There are also costs associated with “backdoor” financing of 
privately-operated prisons and immigration detention centers through 
the use of revenue bonds.242  According to a 2007 exposé by Kevin 
Pranis, then a policy analyst with Justice Strategies, there are 
significant long-term expenses associated with prison and jail 
financing schemes.  “A review of recent prison, jail, and detention 
expansion initiatives shows that federal, state, and local governments 
are using backdoor financing mechanisms to borrow hundreds of 
millions of dollars to build facilities that the public does not want and 
cannot afford,” Pranis wrote.243  “Easy access to investment capital 
permits policy makers to commit to thousands of new prison beds that 
will cost billions of dollars to operate over the coming decades while 
putting, as they say in the car commercials, ‘nothing down.’”244
J. Fraud and Corruption 
 
While some level of corruption is likely present in all corrections 
systems, both public and private, government-operated prisons do not 
have a profit motivation—the need to make money—that is 
conducive to fraudulent practices.  Private companies do have a profit 
motivation.  Unsurprisingly, then, there have been several examples 
of private prison contractors engaging in corruption, fraud, or other 
unethical practices, which constitutes another cost-shifting factor 
when comparing public and private prisons. 
In 2005, an audit by Florida’s Department of Management Services 
(DMS) reported that over an eight-year period, CCA and the GEO 
Group were overpaid around $12.7 million—including $4.7 million for 
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vacant employee positions, $5 million in “salary additives,” and $2.85 
million paid to CCA for facility maintenance the company did not 
perform.245  “Our review showed numerous instances where [private 
prison] vendors’ interests were considered over the State’s interests,” 
the DMS report stated.246  The GEO Group argued that the 
overpayments were authorized pursuant to its contract with the state, 
and agreed to repay only $402,541.247  CCA agreed to pay $1.55 
million—leaving the state approximately $10.7 million short.248
More recently, CCA issued a press release on April 11, 2013, 
acknowledging that employees at the company’s Idaho Correctional 
Center (ICC) had falsified staffing records and billed the state for 
almost 4800 hours for vacant positions.
 
249  “[E]mployees were being 
placed on the shift schedule who were not present within the building 
or who were actually working in other areas and in some cases were 
no longer employees of CCA,” said Boise attorney T.J. Angstman, 
who represents prisoners in a federal lawsuit related to high levels of 
violence at ICC.250
As a result of the falsified records and understaffing at the prison, 
in September 2013 CCA was held in civil contempt in a class-action 
suit filed by the ACLU of Idaho, for failing to comply with the terms 
of a settlement agreement involving staffing levels at ICC.
 
251  CCA 
agreed to pay $1 million to Idaho to cover the cost of the falsified 
staffing hours.252
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the state for all of its losses; state officials commissioned an 
independent audit, which estimated that CCA had understaffed ICC 
by more than 26,000 hours in one year alone.253  The company has 
contested the audit findings.254
Another example of corruption involves Christopher B. Epps, 
former director of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and 
former president of the American Correctional Association, who was 
indicted in November 2014 on federal bribery and kickback 
charges.
 
255  Epps was accused of accepting almost $2 million in bribes 
in connection with prison vendor contracts; he allegedly received the 
bribes from Cecil McCrory, who, among other positions, served as a 
paid consultant to Management and Training Corporation—a private 
prison firm with contracts in Mississippi.256  Epps’ indictment led to 
calls to examine the state’s contracts with private prison companies.257  
Epps and McCrory pleaded guilty to corruption charges in February 
2015.258
Further, a report issued by the Office of the Inspector General of 
the U.S. Department of Justice found that with respect to a contract 
to house BOP prisoners at the GEO Group-operated Reeves County 
Detention Center in Texas, “Reeves County improperly requested 
and the BOP improperly paid $1.95 million in fringe benefits it was 
not entitled to receive, including $175,436 in payroll  taxes and 
workers’ compensation insurance that were incorrectly calculated.”
 
259
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The Inspector General’s report also noted that between February 
2007 and December 2014, the Reeves County facility:  
[W]as rated “deficient” or “unsatisfactory” in 6 of 12 award fee 
evaluation periods.  BOP’s award fee rating reports reflected that 
[the facility] consistently struggled to meet or exceed baseline 
contractual standards, received an unacceptable number of 
deficiencies and notices of concern; was unresponsive to BOP 
inquiries; struggled with staffing issues in health services and 
correctional services; and frequently submitted inaccurate routine 
paperwork, including erroneous disciplinary hearing records and 
monthly invoices.260
Other forms of fraud and corruption involving private prison 
companies likely go undetected, and thus the associated losses—and 
costs to public agencies—are unknown and impossible to quantify. 
 
IV.  QUALITY OF SERVICE COMPARISONS 
Thus far this Article has focused on factors related to cost 
comparisons between public and private prisons.261
As stated in the 1996 GAO report: 
  Whether or not 
private prisons “save money,” however, is not the sole consideration; 
whether they provide an equivalent quality of service is important, 
too.  After all, cheaper is not always better with respect to our 
criminal justice system.  We tend to get what we pay for. 
Although comparative costs are very important, they are not the 
only factors considered by policymakers in deciding the direction or 
extent of corrections privatization.  A principal concern is whether 
private contractors can operate at lower costs to the taxpayers, while 
providing the same or even a better level of service as the public 
sector, particularly with respect to safety and security issues.262
Also, as noted by Associate Professor Alexander Volokh in an 
article addressing the need for performance measures at privately-
operated facilities, “[i]f we find that a private prison costs less, how do 
we know that it did not achieve that result by cutting quality?”
 
263
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Additionally, cost and quality of service are directly related: lower 
costs typically lead to lower quality, while a performance-based 
contract that calls for higher quality service outcomes can be expected 
to result in higher costs.  Again, we get what we pay for, and when 
public agencies contract carceral functions to the lowest bidder, high 
quality of service should not be expected. 
As with cost comparison studies, research on quality of service in 
public versus private prisons has reached equivocal conclusions.264
Our conclusion is that prison privatization provides neither a clear 
advantage nor disadvantage compared with publicly managed 
prisons.  Neither cost savings nor improvements in quality of 
confinement are guaranteed through privatization.  Across the 
board, effect sizes were small, so small that the value of moving to a 
privately managed system is questionable.
  
According to the 2009 meta-analysis by the University of Utah: 
265
One researcher has suggested incentivizing private prison 
companies to achieve desired performance outcomes through 




Through the tax codes of participating governments, private prison 
companies could claim the various PPR credits upon meeting 
specific, tangible, state-mandated benchmarks.  For example, a 
benchmark might consist of a five percent annual decrease in rape 
incidents, a five percent annual decrease in prison assault incidents, 
increased employee training through a state-certified program, 
implementation of transitional programming that sixty percent of 
inmates attend with eighty percent of them meeting certain 
educational goals, or other specific goals.
  According to this proposal: 
267
Potential weaknesses with this approach include the fact that CCA 
and GEO Group, the nation’s two largest private prison firms, are 
both real estate investment trusts (REITs) with very low tax 
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burdens;268
A. Violence Levels 
 also, performance data for the proposed benchmarks 
would be largely self-reported by the privately-operated prisons. 
While quality-of-service comparisons are often subjective, some 
benchmarks, such as levels of institutional violence in public and 
private prisons, can be more readily analyzed.  Several studies have 
found higher rates of violence at privately-operated facilities despite 
the fact that they usually house minimum- and medium-security 
prisoners while public prisons hold offenders of all security levels, 
including maximum-security. 
For example, a 2004 article in Federal Probation found that private 
prisons had more than twice as many prisoner-on-prisoner assaults 
than in public prisons,269 and a 2001 Bureau of Justice Assistance 
report found privately-operated facilities reported 50% more 
prisoner-on-prisoner assaults and almost 50% more prisoner-on-staff 
assaults than in public prisons with comparable security levels.270
According to a 2008 report by Idaho DOC investigator Tim 
Higgins, known as the Higgins report: “[s]ince the beginning of 2008, 
incidents of violence at the Idaho Correctional Center has [sic] 
steadily increased to the point that there are four incidents for every 
one that occurs in the rest of the Idaho state operated facilities 
combined.”
 
271  The CCA-operated Idaho Correctional Center, 
discussed previously, is also called the “Gladiator School” due to such 
high levels of violence.272
Further, a Human Rights Defense Center analysis of violent 
incidents at public and private prisons in Tennessee, conducted by 
this author based on data provided by state officials pursuant to 
public records requests, found that rates of violence at private prisons 
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were 29% higher in 2010, 15.7% higher in 2011, 22.7% higher in 2012, 
and 15.8% higher in 2013 compared with state prisons.273  The analysis 
used data related to prisoner-on-prisoner assaults, prisoner-on-staff 
assaults, and institutional disturbances, and violent incident rates 
were calculated based on the population levels at public and 
privately-operated Tennessee prisons.274
Additionally, a 2013 report by Ohio’s Correctional Institution 
Inspection Committee found that within the first year after CCA 
purchased and began operating the Lake Erie Correctional 
Institution, the rate of prisoner-on-prisoner assaults was “significantly 
higher than the rate for comparator prisons,” though slightly lower 
than the state prison system average.
 
275  Further, the rate of prisoner-
on-staff assaults “was significantly higher” than the rate at 
comparison prisons as well as the state prison system average, and the 
total number of disturbances at the facility “doubled in comparison to 
prior years.”276  The rate of use-of-force incidents was lower than the 
prison system average, but “more than 1.5 times the average of 
comparator prisons.”277
B. Staff Turnover 
 
Staff turnover rates can constitute another quality of service 
benchmark.  High staff turnover means there are fewer experienced 
staff at a facility, more new “green” employees, and thus potentially 
greater institutional instability.  Increased staff turnover may also 
reflect employee dissatisfaction with the quality of the prison work 
environment, including safety and security. 
Historically, private prisons have had significantly higher staff 
turnover rates than public prisons.  According to the last available 
self-reported data from private prison companies, from The 2000 
Corrections Yearbook, the average turnover rate at privately-
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operated prisons was 52.2% while the average rate at public prisons 
was 16%.278
More recently, according to a December 2008 Texas Senate 
Committee on Criminal Justice report: “[d]uring FY 2008 the 
correctional officer turnover rate at the seven private prisons [in 
Texas] was 90 percent (60 percent for the five privately-operated state 
jails), which in either case is higher than the 24 percent turnover rate 
for TDCJ correctional officers during FY 2008.”
 
279
Other examples include a 2013 report by Ohio’s Correctional 
Institution Inspection Committee, which noted higher staff turnover 
rates at the CCA-owned and operated Lake Erie Correctional 
Institution.  “In December 2012, the staff turnover rate for total staff 
exceeded 20 percent.  Correctional officer turnover rate was reported 
as 19.7 percent,” the report found.
 
280  “In comparison, the DRC [state 
corrections department] staff turnover rate is reportedly 12.7 
percent.”281
Further, a March 2013 report by MGT of America, commissioned 
by New Hampshire officials to evaluate responses to the state’s RFP 
for a private prison contract, stated: 
 
In prior MGT studies of private correctional facility operations, we 
have found private correctional facilities with annual staff turnover 
rates of 42 percent compared to 13.3 percent for nearby public 
facilities.  High turnover, which can result from non-competitive 
compensation levels, produces a chronically inexperienced work 
force with direct implications for the integrity of facility security and 
safety.282
Consequently, when comparing quality of service at private versus 
public prisons, staff turnover and the impact it has on facility 
operations can constitute a useful performance measure. 
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C. ACA Accreditation 
The Hakim and Blackstone study cited standards established by 
the American Correctional Association (ACA) as an appropriate 
measure for quality of service, calling ACA accreditation a “robust 
and useful practical indicator of quality in the operations and 
management of prisons.”283
According to the 1996 GAO report: 
  However, using ACA accreditation as a 
benchmark for correctional quality is problematic and impractical for 
several reasons. 
Comparing the quality of service at private and public prisons also 
presents challenges and, in fact, can be more difficult than 
comparing costs.  The concept of ‘quality’ is neither easily defined 
nor measured.  For example, although the American Correctional 
Association (ACA) sets accreditation standards for prisons, 
accredited facilities can vary widely in terms of overall quality.  
According to ACA officials, such variances occur because ACA 
accreditation means that a facility has met minimum standards.284
In fact, the ACA is a private organization, primarily composed of 
and directed by current and former corrections officials, that 
establishes its own standards with no oversight beyond the ACA 
itself.
 
285  The ACA basically “sells” accreditation to correctional 
facilities (both public and private) by charging substantial fees.  
According to the ACA’s pricing chart, accreditation fees range from 
$8100 to $19,500 depending on the number of days and auditors 
involved, and the number of facilities being accredited.286  The ACA 
relies heavily on such fees; it reported receiving more than $4.5 
million in accreditation fees in 2011—almost half its total revenue 
that year.287
There is also a potential conflict of interest relative to ACA 
accreditation being used as a quality of service measure for private 
prisons, because close connections exist between the ACA and the 
private prison industry.  The ACA’s past president, Davidson County, 
  The organization thus has a financial incentive to “sell” 
as many accreditations as possible. 
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Tennessee, Sheriff Daron Hall, is a former CCA program manager, 
while CCA vice president Harley Lappin and CCA warden Cherry 
Lindamood serve on the ACA’s Standards Committee.288  Among 
other companies, the ACA’s 2015 Winter Conference listed CCA, the 
GEO Group, and MTC as sponsors.289  Further, the ACA 
accreditation process is basically a paper audit; the ACA does not 
provide oversight or ongoing monitoring of correctional facilities, but 
only verifies whether a facility has policies that comply with the 
ACA’s self-promulgated standards.290
As a result, some facilities have experienced significant problems 
despite being accredited.  For example, the CCA-operated Otter 
Creek Correctional Center in Kentucky was accredited by the ACA 
in 2009 when at least five prison employees were prosecuted for 
raping or sexually abusing prisoners.
 
291  Two states withdrew their 
female prisoners from Otter Creek following the sex scandal, but the 
facility retained its ACA accreditation.292
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administrative control that flow from written procedures, and careful documentation 
of practices and events.  But, for the most part, the standards prescribe neither the 
goals that ought to be achieved nor the indicators that would let officials know if they 
are making progress toward those goals over time.”), https://www.prisonlegal
news.org/media/publications/Governments%20Management%20of%20Private%20
Prisons%20-%20September%202003.pdf. 
 291. Ian Urbina, Hawaii to Remove Inmates Over Abuse Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/us/26kentucky.html.  The CCA-
operated Otter Creek facility was accredited by the ACA before the sex abuse 
scandal. See 2008 ACA Round-Up: A Year of Excellence in Accreditation, CCA 
(Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.cca.com/insidecca/2008-aca-round-up-a-year-of-excellence-
in-accreditation. 
 292. On July 20, 2011, after the sex abuse scandal, CCA announced that Otter 
Creek had been reaccredited by the ACA. Thirteen CCA Facilities Earn ACA 
Reaccreditation, CCA (July 20, 2011), www.cca.com/insidecca/thirteen-cca-facilities-
earn-aca-reaccreditation.  Both Hawaii and Kentucky removed their female prisoners 
from Otter Creek following the scandal. First Hawaii, Now Kentucky Orders Pullout 
from Prison, STAR BULLETIN (Jan. 10, 2010), http://archives.starbulletin.com/
content/20100110_First_Hawaii_now_Kentucky_orders_pullout_from_prison. 
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The privately-operated Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility 
in Mississippi was accredited by the ACA even though the U.S. 
Department of Justice found “systemic, egregious practices” at the 
facility, including “brazen” sexual activity between staff and offenders 
that was “among the worst that we’ve seen in any facility anywhere in 
the nation.”293  When approving a settlement in a class-action lawsuit 
against Walnut Grove in 2012, a U.S. District Court Judge wrote that 
the facility had “allowed a cesspool of unconstitutional and inhuman 
acts and conditions to germinate, the sum of which places the 
offenders at substantial ongoing risk.”294
More recently, as noted above, the ACA-accredited, CCA-
operated Idaho Correctional Center has been cited for extremely high 
levels of violence, understaffing, and fraudulent reporting of staffing 
hours.
 
295  A video of CCA officers failing to intervene while one 
prisoner was brutally beaten by another has been widely circulated.296  
CCA was held in contempt by a federal court in September 2013 for 
violating a settlement in a class-action lawsuit against the facility,297 
and a separate suit alleges that CCA employees collaborated with 
gang members to maintain control at the prison.298  The state assumed 
management of the Idaho Correctional Center on July 1, 2014, and 
the FBI is currently conducting an investigation into CCA’s staffing 
fraud.299  Regardless, the prison remains accredited by the ACA.300
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 297. See Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (D. Idaho 2013). 
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 299. Rebecca Boone, APNewsBreak: FBI Investigates Prison Company, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 7, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-fbi-
investigates-prison-company-cca. 
 300. To determine whether a facility is accredited, the ACA provides a searchable 
online directory. See Search ACA Accredited Facilities, ACA, www.aca.org/
ACA_Prod_IMIS/ACA_Member/Standards___Accreditation/Accredited_Facilities/
Facility_Directory/ACA_Member/Standards_and_Accreditation/Accredited_Facility
_Directory.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
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Further, federal courts have held it is “absurd” and “simply 
ludicrous” to defer to accreditation as a defense to claims of 
unconstitutional prison and jail conditions.301
These examples illustrate that ACA accreditation is a poor 
measure of quality of service, whether for public or privately-
operated correctional facilities. 
 
D. Recidivism Rates Redux 
As discussed previously, a number of studies have measured 
recidivism outcomes in public and private prisons.  Yet recidivism is 
typically not used as a quality of service benchmark with respect to 
prison privatization; only recently has one state decided to adopt 
recidivism rates as a performance measure. 
In 2013, Pennsylvania officials announced they would provide 
financial incentives to privately-operated community corrections 
facilities—halfway houses—that are able to reduce recidivism rates of 
offenders released from those facilities.302
The initiative followed a report that found high recidivism rates in 
the state, with prisoners released from halfway houses (most of which 
are privately-operated) having higher rates than those released 
directly from prison.
 
303  An average recidivism rate based on data 
from the report is used as a baseline, and privately-operated 
community corrections facilities must meet the baseline rate within a 
standard deviation or risk losing their contracts.304  Those that achieve 
rates at least 10% lower than the baseline will receive a financial 
bonus of one percent of the contract amount.305
                                                                                                                             
 301. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 2004); Boulies v. Ricketts, 518 F. 
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org/news/2014/oct/10/how-courts-view-aca-accreditation. 
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27–36 (2013), available at http://ccjs.umd.edu/sites/ccjs.umd.edu/files/PA%20
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Houses in Pennsylvania, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.prison
legalnews.org/news/2014/sep/19/recidivism-performance-measures-private-halfway-
houses-pennsylvania; see also PA DOC Community Corrections Contract Appendix 
L Re Recidivism Measures 2014, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Apr. 24, 2015), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/publications/pa-doc-community-corrections-
contract-appendix-l-re-recidivism-measures-2014. 
 305. Palazzolo, supra note 302. 
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“It’s not unreasonable for us to expect them to have an impact on 
crime, because that’s what we’re paying them to do,” said 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Secretary John E. Wetzel.306  
“We want to measure performance.  We want quantifiable 
performance,” added Kristofer Bret Bucklen, director of the DOC’s 
Office of Planning, Research and Statistics.307
The DOC’s community corrections contracts were rebid in 2013 to 
include the recidivism rate performance measure provisions.
 
308  
According to Bucklen, the initial performance measure period was 
based on recidivism data for an abbreviated three-month span from 
December 2013 to March 2014, while future periods will cover six-
month spans.309
Bucklen said the state’s approximately forty privately-operated 
community corrections facilities achieved an average 16.4% reduction 




Nine of the facilities significantly reduced recidivism rates during 
the initial period and qualified to receive a bonus; one facility 
significantly exceeded the benchmark and was placed on warning 
status.
 
311  This indicates that, given the proper incentives (financial 
bonuses) and disincentives (potential loss of contracts), private 
contractors can be motivated to meet specified performance 
standards.  Future recidivism performance measures by the 
Pennsylvania DOC will demonstrate whether positive results are 
achieved on an ongoing basis.312
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Similarly, in early 2015, news reports indicated that a private prison 
in Australia would operate under a contract that provides a financial 
bonus if the facility reduces recidivism rates.  The 1000-bed Ravenhall 
prison will be constructed and operated by the GEO Consortium, 
which includes GEO Group Australia.313
V.  OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
 
Finally, there is one last cost factor that should be taken into 
consideration when comparing public and privately-operated prisons: 
the opportunity cost of contracting with for-profit prison companies 
rather than pursuing alternative solutions to prison overcrowding and 
mass incarceration. 
The prison and jail population in the United States has increased 
dramatically over the past several decades, from around 646,000 in 
1983 to more than 2.2 million as of 2012,314 coinciding with our 
nation’s incessant War on Crime and War on Drugs.315  In the 1980s 
and 1990s, a series of I-can-be-tougher-on-crime-than-you laws were 
enacted, spurred by the aforementioned domestic wars and a steady 
drumbeat of violent crime coverage by the news media.316  Such laws 
included mandatory minimums, truth-in-sentencing statutes, and 
three-strikes laws, which require lengthy prison terms or life 
sentences for certain offenders.317
Consequently, more people were arrested (mainly for drug-related 
offenses), prosecuted, convicted, and sent to prison, where they 
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served longer sentences.318  Prison release policies concurrently 
became more restrictive; for example, parole in the federal prison 
system was abolished in 1987.319  With more people entering the 
prison system to serve longer sentences, and fewer leaving, the U.S. 
prison population expanded rapidly—increasing about 350% from 
1983 to the present.320
The growing prison population in turn created a market for 
additional prison and jail beds, and for-profit companies such as CCA 
(founded in 1983) and the GEO Group (founded as Wackenhut 




At the beginning of the 1980s there were no privately-operated 
adult correctional facilities in the United States.
 
322  As of 2012, 
approximately 128,300 state and federal prisoners were held in for-
profit lock-ups—around 8.6% of that total population.323
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centers and local jails.324  So long as public officials confronted with 
expanding prison populations could house their excess prisoners in 
privately-operated facilities, they did not have to pursue politically 
unpopular “soft-on-crime” options such as sentencing reforms, early 
releases, or alternatives to incarceration.  To use an analogy, as a 
steady stream of offenders filled the prison system bucket to 
overflowing, the extra bed space provided by the private prison 
industry allowed prisoners to be siphoned into an “overflow” bucket, 
so the stream could continue flowing unabated.  Indeed, some states 
have become dependent on private prisons to house their bloated 
prison populations.  As of the end of 2011, eight states held more than 
20% of their prisoners in privately-operated facilities, including New 
Mexico (40.8%), Montana (38.6%), Alaska (31.0%), and Idaho 
(30.1%).325
Absent private prisons and the additional bed space they provide, 
policy makers would have been forced to turn to other solutions to 
address problems associated with prison overcrowding and mass 
incarceration—solutions that are only now being implemented due to 
the recent Great Recession and its impact on government budgets.
 
326
Such solutions include sentencing reform, early prisoner releases, 
justice reinvestment initiatives, expanded clemency projects, 
alternatives to incarceration, more funding for reentry programs, and 
even marijuana decriminalization and legalization.
 
327
                                                                                                                             
 324. See, e.g. BETHANY CARSON & ELEANA DIAZ, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, 
PAYOFF: HOW CONGRESS ENSURES PRIVATE PRISON PROFIT WITH AN IMMIGRANT 
DETENTION QUOTA 6 (2015), available at http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/
files/reports/quota_report_final_digital.pdf; CODY MASON, DOLLARS AND 
DETAINEES: THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION (2012), available at http://
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Dollars_and_Detainees.pdf. 
  A growing 
 325. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 32 (2012), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf. 
 326. David Reutter, Economic Crisis Prompts Prison Closures Nationwide, but 
Savings (and Reforms) Are Elusive, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (April 15, 2009), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2009/apr/15/economic-crisis-prompts-prison-
closures-nationwide-8232but-savings-and-reforms-are-elusive. 
 327. For example, the legalization of marijuana in Washington State and Colorado, 
and the legalization of medical marijuana in a growing number of other states. See 
Marijuana Resource Center: State Laws Related to Marijuana, OFFICE NAT’L DRUG 
CONTROL POL’Y, www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/state-laws-related-to-marijuana (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
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number of states are reducing their prison populations328 and even 
closing correctional facilities.329
Private prison companies, however, have little incentive to seek 
reductions in incarceration levels.  As stated in CCA’s 2013 annual 
report, with respect to business and industry risk factors: 
 
Our growth is generally dependent upon our ability to obtain new 
contracts to develop and manage new correctional and detention 
facilities.  This possible growth depends on a number of factors we 
cannot control, including crime rates and sentencing patterns in 
various jurisdictions, governmental budgetary constraints, and 
governmental and public acceptance of privatization.  The demand 
for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the 
relaxation of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole 
standards and sentencing practices or through the decriminalization 
of certain activities that are currently proscribed by criminal laws.330
Specifically, CCA noted that risk factors for the company included 
“changes with respect to drugs and controlled substances or illegal 
immigration,” which “could affect the number of persons arrested, 
convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially reducing demand for 
correctional facilities to house them.”
 
331  Additionally, “reductions in 
crime rates or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce crime could 
lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring 
incarceration at correctional facilities.”332
In summary, by providing additional overflow bed space for the 
past three decades, the private prison industry has helped to stymie 
sentencing and other criminal justice reforms that would have 
reduced the prison population, and thus the overall cost of our justice 
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system—which is currently estimated at $60 to $70 billion annually.333
CONCLUSION 
  
This is the opportunity cost of contracting with for-profit prison 
companies rather than pursuing other options to address our nation’s 
reliance on mass incarceration. 
Ultimately, cost comparisons between private and public prisons 
may best be accomplished by examining actual costs incurred during 
separate time periods when the same facility is privately and publicly 
operated, and houses a similar prisoner population.  That would, in 
theory, constitute an apples-to-apples comparison rather than apples-
to-oranges—or fish.  Fortunately there are several instructive 
examples in this regard. 
CCA managed the Hernando County jail in Florida for twenty-two 
years, until the company and county parted ways in 2010.334  
According to the Tampa Bay Times, one year after the switch from 
private to public management, “[i]n total, with an annual jail budget 
of $10.9 million, jail officials say they’re saving taxpayers more than 
$1 million this year, compared to what CCA would have charged the 
county.”335  According to another news report, CCA’s “actual costs” 
for operating the Hernando County jail in 2009 were $12.3 million, 
with projected costs of $11 million for 2010.336  County officials 
confirmed that after the Sheriff’s Office assumed management of the 
jail, the budget in FY 2011—the first full year of operation—was $10.9 
million.337  The budget for FY 2012 was $10.62 million, while the 
budget for FY 2013 was $10.53 million—all less than what the county 
had been paying CCA.338
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CCA also operated the Bay County Jail in Florida until 2008, when 
the Sheriff took over management of the facility.339  Local officials 
confirmed that during the last year of the CCA contract (FY 2007–
2008), the county paid the company $16.6 million.340  During the first 
year after the Sheriff’s Office assumed management at the jail (FY 
2008–2009), actual operational costs were $15.9 million; during the 
second year (FY 2009–2010), actual operational costs were $16.5 
million.341  The county noted that “if CCA had continued operating 
the jail at the figures it had proposed before an impasse was reached 
and they walked away,” the costs would have been $16.7 million in 
FY 2008-09 and $17.1 million in FY 2009-10.342  Also, according to 
county officials, those savings did “not include about $600,000 the 
county has saved from using inmate labor to clean roads, parks, 
buildings and cemeteries.”343
In spite of these real world examples, and this Article’s extensive 
discussion of cost-shifting factors, the original question remains: do 
private prisons save money?  Considering the numerous and 
complicated factors involved in cost comparisons of public and 
privately-operated facilities, and the corresponding difficulties in 
conducting such studies, it is possible that we are simply asking the 
wrong question. 
 
The right one may be: should we incarcerate people in private, for-
profit prisons even if they do save money?  Regardless, to paraphrase 
the late Richard Culp, Associate Professor at the John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, if three decades of experience with and research 
related to prison privatization have not led to demonstrable cost 
savings or quality of service outcomes, resulting in articles such as this 
one, then we need to take a different approach relative to our nation’s 
carceral policies, practices, and priorities.344
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